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ABSTRACT
Cache coherency is crucial to multi-core systems with a shared memory programming
model. Coherency protocols have been formally verified at the architectural level with
relative ease. However, several subtle issues creep into the hardware realization of cache
in a multi-processor environment. The assumption, made in the abstract model, that state
transitions are atomic, is invalid for the HDL implementation. Each transition is composed
of many concurrent multi-core operations. As a result, even with a blocking bus, several
transient states come into existence. Most modern processors optimize communication
with a split-transaction bus, this results in further transient states and race conditions.
Therefore, the design and verification of cache coherency is increasingly complex and
challenging.
Simulation techniques are insufficient to ensure memory consistency and the absence
of deadlock, livelock, and starvation. At best, it is tediously complex and time consuming
to reach confidence in functionality with simulation. Formal methods are ideally suited to
identify the numerous race conditions and subtle failures. In this study, we perform formal
property verification on the RTL of a multi-core level-1 cache design based on snooping
MESI protocol. We demonstrate full-proof verification of the coherence module in Jasper-
Gold using complexity reduction techniques through parameterization. We verify that the
assumptions needed to constrain inputs of the stand-alone cache coherence module are
satisfied as valid assertions in the instantiation environment. We compare results obtained
from formal property verification against a state-of-the-art UVM environment. We high-
light the benefits of a synergistic collaboration between simulation and formal techniques.
We present formal analysis as a generic toolkit with numerous usage models in the digital
design process.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Caches are vital components of modern processors. They dramatically improve system
performance by reducing the number of accesses to main memory. Most microprocessors
have several layers of cache to hide the increasing divide between processor and memory
performance. In the current era of multi-core systems, we are presented with two archi-
tectural choices: a shared memory model or a distributed model. The distributed model
dictates that each core has its own private memory. Different cores exchange informa-
tion using a message passing interface. The shared memory model, which assumes that
all cores access a common, single memory, is more popular of the two options. At any
instance of time, multiple cached copies could exist in a shared memory system. There-
fore, coherence and consistency are crucial in order to ensure correct functionality of such
a system. This chapter establishes formal definitions of coherence, consistency and the
MESI protocol.
1.1 Cache Coherence
A typical shared memory system is illustrated in Figure 1.1. Multiple agents are con-
nected through an interconnection network. An agent could be a processor, a direct mem-
ory access (DMA) block, or an external device that can write and read from memory. All
the agents can perform loads and stores to all physical addresses. Each agent has its own
private cache, and the last-level cache (LLC) is shared by all the cores.
Multiple copies of a data block can exist in the system. Intuitively, coherence implies
that all the agents see the same, correct value of the datum at a given time. This is essential
to ensure compliance with the shared memory model, and ease of debug. Additionally,
caches are architecturally invisible, dictating that programmers should not functionally
identify the presence or absence of caches.
1
Figure 1.1: A typical shared memory system
Numerous definitions of cache coherence can be found in published literature. But, a
coherent system would satisfy all the definitions, as they are equivalent. In this study, our
preferred definition of coherence is that offered by Hill et al. [2]. The following invariants
compose the formal definition1 of coherence [2].
1. Single-Writer, Multiple-Read (SWMR) Invariant: At a given logical time, a sin-
gle core can have read-write access or multiple cores can have read only access to a
given memory location.
2. Data-Value (DV) Invariant: The value of a given data block is the same as the last
write access.
Memory consistency, a related concept, is often confused with coherence. Consis-
tency specifies that "a system should appear to execute all threads’ loads and stores to all
memory locations in a total order that respects the program order of each thread" [2]. A
distinguishing feature between coherency and consistency is that coherency is defined on
1Invariants SWMR and DV are captured and proven as interface level assertions in our FPV effort
2
a per-memory location basis, while consistency is specified with respect to all memory
locations. Although, it is theoretically possible to have a consistent model with incoher-
ence [3], this topic remains an academic curiosity. Consistency is achieved through coher-
ence protocols. Therefore, cache protocols are vital to the correct design and functionality
of a modern processor.
1.2 Coherence Protocols
Coherence protocols enforce the two invariants necessary in a coherent system. Pro-
tocols are implemented as a finite state machine(FSM) in each of the storage structures
(cache and LLC). A distributed system of cache controllers communicate with each other
using transactions and messages to ensure coherence. The type and number of messages
and states depends on the particular cache coherence protocol.
In general, there are two classes of protocols, namely snooping-based and directory-
based [4]. Snooping-based mechanisms rely on broadcasting messages to all the agents.
Most commonly, cores observe the transactions over a shared bus interface and respond ac-
cordingly. Collectively, all the controllers ensure coherence. Within directory-based tech-
niques, a central directory holds the state of each data block. State contains information
about the current owner (read-write) or sharers (read-only). Requests are point-to-point
in directory based controllers. In this study, we consider a snooping-based protocol that
relies on a shared bus interconnect, as it is predominant in modern multi-core processors.
Additionally, cache controllers can be classified into invalidate and update protocols,
based on action performed in case of a CPU write. An invalidate protocol would request
other agents to invalidate their copy of the data block. An update protocol would rather
update all existing copies of the block within the system. We restrict our scope to the
MESI protocol, which is a popular invalidate technique.
MESI represents the four possible states of a cache block, namely modified, exclusive,
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Figure 1.2: The architectural MESI state diagram
shared, and invalid. The architectural state diagram of the MESI protocol is illustrated in
Figure 1.2. A processor has read-write access to a block that is in modified or exclusive
state in its private cache. At a given time, any one of the agents alone can have a block in
modified or exclusive state. A block in shared state provides read-only access to the core.
Transitions to the left of states in Figure 1.2 represent processor side requests and the
subsequent controller action on the shared bus. More precisely, read and write are requests
from the core; bus rdx (read to modify), bus rd (read-only) and invalidate are requests
broadcast on the shared system bus. State transitions to the right on Figure 1.2, signify
incoming bus requests and corresponding responses. Collectively, all the cache controllers
work together, by adhering to the MESI state diagram, to realize a coherent system.
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2. VERIFICATION OF CACHE COHERENCE
In this chapter, we motivate the need for full-proof verification of cache controllers.
We present previous work and distinguish it from this thesis in Section 2.2. Thereafter, we
describe our approach, objectives, and design implementation in Sections 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5
respectively.
2.1 Need for Robust Verification
The design and verification of cache controllers is notoriously complex [5]. Aside
from design and performance considerations, a cache implementation must consider the
coherence protocol as well as the communication fabric for functional robustness. The
coherence protocol is subject to several race conditions in a truly parallel system with
concurrent requests. The MESI protocol defined in Section 1.2 is an abstract model, it
simplifies numerous details which are of critical significance in the hardware realization.
Firstly, state transitions are assumed to be atomic in the architectural model. This
is impossible to achieve in implementation. The controller would arbitrate for shared
resources like the system bus, before performing a state transition. This non-atomicity
leads to the existence of transient states. A typical modern processor’s cache has about 4
stable states and around 10 transient states [6]. Transient states increase the complexity
and lead to additional race conditions. The presence of an atomic bus does not obviate the
need for transient states. Although a blocking bus would ensure that not more than one
transaction is outstanding on the system bus, state transitions could still be non-atomic.
Transient states necessary for a MESI-based controller with an atomic bus is depicted in
Figure 2.1 [7]. Transitions due to incoming system bus requests are hidden in Figure
2.1 for simplicity. Race conditions arise when conflicting requests are observed on the
processor side and the system bus side. The large number of states and race conditions
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Figure 2.1: Simplified MESI state diagram with transition states
make verification and design extremely challenging.
Second, several performance optimizations are introduced in modern designs. The
most prominent example is a split transaction bus. A blocking bus is inefficient from
a performance viewpoint. Therefore, modern processors allow multiple outstanding re-
quests on the shared system bus. This would require buffers within the cache controller
in order to track outstanding requests. Responses to the system bus requests could arrive
out of order. As a result, the design complexity increases tremendously. Recent improve-
ments like write-back buffers, complex interconnection networks, hardware transactional
memory, and hierarchical caches further contribute to the design complexity.
Additionally, the communication fabric of the controller is prone to deadlock, live-
lock and starvation. Therefore, we must also verify the communication infrastructure for
6
correctness, liveness, and fairness.
Simulation-based techniques alone are insufficient in the verification of caches. They
often fail to identify race conditions and critical failures in corner case scenarios. It is
challenging to reach confidence in coherence using simulation due to concurrency, and
the large number of states and transitions in a cache controller. Vantrease et al. assert
that a total of 60 state transitions exist in the simple MSI protocol, when we consider race
conditions [6]. Simulation suffers from the lack of controllability, and tedious debug. Sim-
ulation does not provide sufficient fine-grained control to exercise interesting corner cases,
mainly due to the rigid nature of test-bench components. Certain legal behavior could be
prevented by inherent assumptions made within testbench components. We depend on
pseudo-random stimulus to fortuitously exercise and identify failing scenarios. The large
number of states and transitions makes it improbable to identify all failing corner cases
in simulation, leading to critical bug escapes. Even in cases when failures are exercised,
debug is tedious and time-consuming due to large traces in which the failure is identified
several thousand cycles after the source of error. Coherence design flaws have escaped
into shipping products in the past. A popular example is the Intel core2duo coherence
bug, "A139: Cache data access request from one core hitting a modified line in the L1
data cache of the other core may cause unpredictable system behavior." [8]. In order to
prevent future bug escapes, design teams must ensure robust verification of the complex
cache controller.
Formal verification with clever abstraction techniques is often cited as the ideal method
for cache verification. There are few documented examples of a verified cache coherence
protocol in SystemVerilog or other hardware description languages [5]. Abstract models
of protocols have been formally verified in the past with relative ease. However, there is a
significant semantic gap between the architectural model and hardware realization. There-
fore, we apply formal property verification to guarantee coherence of our MESI-cache
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RTL implementation. This was primarily enabled by parameterizing the implementation
to solve the complexity problem that would otherwise prevent full-proof verification of the
RTL model.
2.2 Previous Work
The design and verification of cache has remained an active research focus for over
three decades [9]. Numerous advancements have been proposed with emphasis on either
performance or security. Specifically within the purview of cache coherence, several tech-
niques have been explored to make the verification problem more tractable. In this section,
we summarize efforts aimed at solving the verification challenge of coherence protocols.
Clarke et al. pioneered the use of formal verification for coherence with the Future-
bus+ protocol in 1993 [10]. Thereafter, coherence protocols are typically verified using
formal techniques only at the architecture level [11, 12, 13, 14, 15] with tools like Murphi
and TLA+. Complexity and the lack of formal tool support for SystemVerilog prohibited
effective application of formal methods to the register-transfer-level (RTL) description. At
the abstract level, subtle implementation details like timing are excluded to reduce com-
plexity, which in turn facilitates formal techniques. However, there is significant semantic
gap between the abstract model and HDL implementation. It is often more challenging
to verify coherence of the HDL implementation of a formally verified abstract protocol
rather than verifying the architectural model [5]. Once the higher level abstract model is
formally verified, equivalence verification is attempted between the RTL implementation
and the abstract model. Pong et al. used formal techniques to verify the protocol, but de-
pended on random simulations to verify the implementation [11]. Standard practice is to
use simulation for RTL verification of cache controllers. Refinement checkers are devel-
oped from the high-level model for use in simulation-based verification of RTL [15]. There
are few published examples of formally verified cache hardware descriptions [5]. Dave et
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al. suggest the use of high-level synthesis to tackle the verification problem [5]. They
demonstrate that automatic synthesis of high-performance, realistic coherence protocols
is feasible using Bluespec SystemVerilog (BSV), a guarded atomic hardware description
language. Formal verification is performed on a modular, parameterized description in
BSV. However, this technique has not been adopted in the industry due to limitations of
high-level synthesis.
Recent developments in formal tools, increasing computation power, and main mem-
ory size permit a thorough reinvestigation of the applicability of formal techniques. There-
fore, we focus on applying clever complexity reduction techniques and standard formal
property verification to a parameterized MESI cache RTL design using JasperGold, a
model checking tool from Cadence.
In our approach, parameterization enables formal property verification on a reduced
configuration of the cache design. Parameterization has previously been used in several
studies to simplify the complexity problem and to verify coherence protocols at the ab-
stract level [14, 16, 17]. Safety and liveness properties of several complex cache protocols
including split transaction versions have been proven in languages like Murphi. Our ap-
proach is unique in the manner that we perform parameterized verification at the RTL
level in SystemVerilog, unlike earlier studies which focus on the guarded atomic model.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to formally verify MESI-based cache
coherence at the RTL level using parameterization.
Alternatively, several efforts have aimed to reduce the complexity and simplify cache
coherence. A notable example is atomic coherence by Vantrease et al. [6], which proposes
the use of optical mutual exclusion to avoid race conditions completely. Verification is
simplified by serializing conflicting coherence requests to the same address. Another ex-
ample is fractal coherence, which provides a design for verification technique of massively
multi-core systems, amenable to formal tools. The DeNovo cache coherence protocol pro-
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posed by Komuravelli and Adve [18, 19], places limitations on the allowed parallelism to
simplify transient states and non-determinism. Our project is independent of the above
techniques. Therefore, our findings can be used to augment and assist validation of the
above methods.
Runtime or dynamic verification in actual hardware is also proposed as a means to
tackle the complex cache verification problem. Cantin et al. demonstrated the use of addi-
tional hardware to detect design errors in addition to manufacturing defects [20]. DeOrio
et al. proposed CoSma, a novel technology to provide post-silicon validation of cache
coherence protocols in multi-core systems [21]. The drawbacks of post-silicon validation
is not limited to hardware and performance overhead alone. Diagnosis of functional errors
is challenging due to the limited internal node observability in prototype hardware [22].
Although testing in hardware is orders of magnitude faster than simulation and formal ver-
ification, postponing detection of functional errors to post-silicon is restricted by the cost
of fabrication.
In 2011, a collaborative initiative between JasperGold and ARM resulted in the for-
mal verification of the ARM AMBA ACE cache coherence [23]. They initially performed
abstract protocol verification, and subsequently completed full-proof verification of the
HDL implementation. Our study has several similarities to the published version of this
effort in many aspects. However, intricate details about the properties and techniques em-
ployed by the industry collaboration remain confidential. Therefore, this work contributes
by highlighting the properties and methods necessary to prove coherence at the RTL level.
2.3 Approach
The primary objective is to develop a cache controller that adheres to the specification,
coherence and a valid communication infrastructure. The interconnect is required to be
free of deadlock, livelock and starvation. Additionally, it should obey the dictated input-
10
Figure 2.2: Verification approach
output protocol. In this study, we begin with a simple legacy implementation which has
been minimally verified with basic test scenarios, similar to how designers in the industry
perform a sanity check before release to the verification team. Therefore, the legacy RTL
is free from trivial design failures. As illustrated in Figure 2.2, we simultaneously apply
simulation and formal techniques to enhance the design as and when we identify bugs.
Bugs are essentially deviations from the defined specification. If necessary, we update the
specification in case of an architectural flaw. The goal is to complete full-proof verification
while eliminating complex corner case bugs and failures.
We offer an effective comparison between simulation and formal methods for the pur-
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pose of cache verification at the HDL level. We develop a state-of-the-art, simulation-
based environment for this purpose, based on the principles of random, coverage driven
verification. Details of the Universal Verification Methodology (UVM) test-bench, a sim-
ulation standard predominantly used in the industry, are provided in Chapter 3. The formal
verification effort is described in Chapter 4. We apply property verification, with clever ab-
straction techniques and a sound complexity staging plan, to our design. Parameterization
of the design is performed to make formal analysis feasible. Equivalence checking, as re-
ported in Section 4.2 is used to ensure correctness and functionality post-parameterization.
We comment about the return-on-investment of engineering effort in simulation, and
formal analysis. Evaluation criteria for the comparison includes, but is not limited to,
critical failures identified, ease of debug, length of failing traces, time to develop the envi-
ronment, and proof of forward progress. Through the effort, we hope to identify methods
suited for a symbiotic relationship between the two techniques. We also wish to summa-
rize the design principles required to enable formal analysis of large, complex designs.
2.4 Objectives
The main objectives of this study are outlined below:
• Define properties necessary to guarantee coherence, and correctness of the commu-
nication infrastructure
• Identify techniques to achieve a synergistic collaboration between simulation and
formal
• Provide a foundation for formal verification of complex, performance-aggressive
cache designs
• Highlight design principles necessary to enable large scale formal verification
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• Develop an effective comparison between simulation and formal methods for coher-
ence verification at the RTL level
2.5 Design Implementation
The cache implementation under consideration is snooping-based with a shared system
bus and uses the MESI coherence protocol. We perform robust verification to transform a
readily available, toy design into a synthesizable, bug-free, product-ready design. A block
diagram of the envisioned system is presented as Figure 2.3. We strive to develop a robust
Register Transfer Level (RTL) description of the level-1 cache and system bus module.
For simulation purposes, we use behavioral models of the cores, arbiter, level-2 cache,
and memory block. The design is heavily parameterized with numerous options available
including number of cores, address width, data width, cache line size, and cache size.
Figure 2.3: System block diagram
Each CPU core is assigned a private level-1 (L1) cache, while all cores share the level-
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2 (L2) unified cache. Address space is partitioned into separate instruction and data space.
L1 cache is separated into data and instruction cache, but level-2 cache is unified and
serves the entire address range. Coherence is maintained through messages on the shared
system bus, in adherence to the MESI cache protocol. An arbiter provides exclusive grant
of the system bus in a round-robin fashion to ensure fairness. The system bus is atomic;
therefore, at any point in time, a maximum of one outstanding request can be pending
on the bus. Caches are inclusive, and conform to write-back and write-allocate mecha-
nisms. Additionally, the design policy operates in accordance with a pseudo-LRU (least
recently used) cache replacement algorithm. The detailed design specification is included
in Appendix A.
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3. SIMULATION-BASED VERIFICATION
Simulation is the primary verification technique for integrated circuit design, widely
used in the industry for over three decades now [24, 25]. Input stimulus is fed to the
design-under-verification (DUV) continuously throughout the duration of the test. Ob-
served outputs are compared with the expected outputs, usually generated by an indepen-
dent reference model. Considerable amount of infrastructure is required to be developed
before any verification can be performed. Common components include stimulus gener-
ators, output monitors, checkers, coverage models, and scoreboards. Stimulus generators
determine inputs to the DUV at every instance (clock cycle). Output monitors capture
the observed outputs into high-level transactions, which are eventually forwarded to the
scoreboard. Checkers are embedded within the monitors and scoreboards to detect forbid-
den behavior or specific failures. Coverage monitors are required to ensure that the entire
range of functionality has been verified. Scoreboards generally house high-level check-
ers and reference models. Most verification components are interdependent. Therefore,
substantial time and effort is required even before basic, typical behavior can be verified.
Over the years, substantial improvements in methodology have resulted in increased
efficiency and shorter verification cycles. The key technologies responsible are pseudo-
random stimulus, intellectual property (IP) based design [26], metric-driven approach,
assertion-based verification [27], and standardized methodologies. Improvements are pri-
marily focused on enhancing re-use, predictability, ease of use, and automation. Though
often incomplete, pseudo-random stimulus is effective in detecting corner cases and cov-
ering a wide range of behavior in a single test scenario. Assertions are critical to detect
flaws early in the design cycle. They pin-point to the actual source of the failure, unlike
high-level checkers, which usually detect failures late and fail to indicate the source. Lay-
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ered stimulus is essential for easy debug and understanding. Standard, open methodologies
like OVM, VMM and UVM provide crucial interoperability between tools, companies and
vendors. We use present-day industry standard techniques throughout the project to get an
accurate comparison between formal and simulation, with respect to cache verification.
In this chapter, we describe the simulation-based verification effort in detail. We de-
velop a state-of-the-art Universal Verification Methodology (UVM) test-bench (TB) built
on SystemVerilog (SV). Proven standard industry practices like coverage (metric) driven
closure, pseudo-random stimulus, and embedded assertions are rigorously enforced and
followed [24, 28, 29].
Figure 3.1: UVM verification environment
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3.1 UVM Verification Environment
UVM is the industry standard technique used for functional hardware verification [24,
29, 30]. We develop a complete UVM verification environment with pseudo-random stim-
ulus and a metric-driven approach to verify our cache design. A key component of this
environment is the transaction-accurate reference model which is used as the golden ver-
sion. Figure 3.1 represents the overall structure of the test-bench. UVM components
developed include CPU agent, virtual sequencer, test cases, scoreboard and the system bus
monitor. Behavioral models are used to describe the level-2 cache, memory, and arbiter.
The RTL blocks and behavioral models are borrowed from a previous project, while UVM
components are devised from scratch. It is important to note that the design (RTL) was par-
tially verified using a testbench-based verification environment in an earlier project with
directed testing. This was similar to a minimalistic test-bench typically used by designers
to verify basic functionality. Therefore, trivial bugs have been weeded out of the design
well in advance. Behavioral models are assumed to be error-free. Hence, the main focus
of verification is the multi-core level-1 cache.
The UVM verification components (UVCs) used in the environment are described be-
low.
• CPU Agent:
The CPU agent extends from the ’uvm_agent’ base class. It consists of a monitor,
a driver, and a sequencer. It mimics the role of a CPU core connected to the level-1
cache in the final SoC design. Sub-components and their functions are listed below:
Driver: extends from ’uvm_driver’ base class. It has access to the CPU-Lv1 inter-
face, through which it interacts with the DUV. It drives signals on the interface
based on transactions received from the sequencer. It connects to the sequencer
through a handshake mechanism inbuilt in UVM.
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Sequencer: extends from ’uvm_sequencer’ base class. It receives transactions from
the virtual sequencer and forwards it to the driver. It behaves in a sequential
manner. Therefore, a maximum of one transaction is driven at any given point
of time.
Monitor: extends from ’uvm_monitor’ base class. It also has access to the CPU-
Lv1 interface, but it can only passively observe the signals. It does not have the
capability to affect any of the interface signals. It packages observed behavior
into meaningful CPU monitor packets, which are passed onto the scoreboard
for high-level checks. Simple interface level checks are implemented as asser-
tions in the monitor. Coverage collectors are also realized in this component.
• System Bus Monitor:
The system bus monitor (SBUS) is a passive component extending from base class
’uvm_monitor’. It observes signals on the system bus interface to create an SBUS
packet. This packet is sent to the scoreboard for comparison with the expected SBUS
packet. SBUS contains checkers for the DUV outputs on the system bus interface.
Collectors are present to monitor coverage on bus activity.
• Scoreboard:
The scoreboard, which extends from ’uvm_scoreboard’, houses the cache reference
model and high level checkers. It is mainly responsible for ensuring transaction
accuracy of the DUV outputs. Two broad classes of DUV outputs are the data re-
turned to the CPU agent, and system bus activity necessary for coherence. The cache
reference model mimics the complete functionality of the DUV. Behavioral model-
ing combined with associative arrays facilitate an efficient implementation in Sys-
temVerilog. The reference model is similar to a guarded atomic model. It assumes
that transactions are atomic, which is not always true in the RTL implementation.
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It provides the expected data and system bus activity for comparison with observed
output packets.
• Virtual Sequencer:
This component is crucial to have fine-grained control of the transactions on each
of the CPU agents. It is also referred to as multi-channel sequencer. We define
temporal relations between operations on agents through the virtual sequencer. For
instance, we can define parallel transactions on each of the CPU agents. It receives
a sequence from the test class and forwards transactions to the agents as specified in
the virtual sequence.
UVM data items enable communication between the various verification infrastructure
components. Three types of transactions are used, namely CPU driver transaction, CPU
monitor packet, and SBUS packet. CPU driver transaction is created in the test class and is
consumed by the CPU driver. CPU monitor packet, as is obvious from the name, is born in
the CPU monitor and consumed by the scoreboard. Similarly, SBUS packet is transferred
from SBUS to the scoreboard. Member elements and their corresponding descriptions are
presented in Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3.
Table 3.1: Elements of CPU driver transaction
Member Description
Request type Read or write request
Data Write data for a write request
Address Address to be accessed
Cache type Instruction or data cache access
Wait cycles Number of clock cycles to wait before driving the transaction
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Table 3.2: Elements of CPU monitor packet
Member Description
Request type Read or write request
Data Data from cache for read or CPU for write
Address Address to be accessed
Cache type Instruction or data cache access
Service time Number of clock cycles for the entire transaction
Illegal Flag to indicate if transaction is invalid i.e. write to I-cache
Table 3.3: Elements of SBUS packet
Member Description
Bus request type BusRD or BusRDX or Invalidate or IcacheRD
Cache number ID of the primary cache which obtained bus access
Address Primary address of the bus request
Read data Data returned to the primary bus request
Request serviced by ID of the cache which serviced the primary bus request
Copy in cache Flag to indicate if ’cp_in_cache’ was asserted
Shared Flag to indicate if ’shared’ signal was high
Snoop requests ID of all the caches which requested snoop access
Snoop write back Flag to indicate if snoop cache performed write-back
Write data snoop Data of the snoop write-back
Dirty evict flag Indication if the primary cache evicted a dirty block
Dirty evict address Address of the evicted cache line
Dirty evict data Data of the eviction
Service time Total number of clock cycles taken by the bus transaction
The verification flow for a single CPU operation in this test-bench is depicted in Fig-
ure 3.2. The CPU transaction is first received by the driver, which stimulates the DUV
input interface accordingly. If the operation requires a system bus message, DUV would
request for bus access and initiate the creation of a SBUS packet. Once the bus request
is complete, the system bus monitor forwards the packet to the scoreboard. Depending
on the primary cache ID, scoreboard pushes the packet into an appropriate queue. Next,
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DUV can respond to the CPU agent with the required data(read request) or ’acknowledge’
signal (write request), completing the CPU operation. As soon as the transaction is com-
pleted, the CPU monitor transmits the monitor packet to the scoreboard. Scoreboard feeds
the CPU packet to the reference model, which in turn provides the ideal data and system
bus activity. Finally, expected SBUS packet is compared with the observed bus activity by
popping an SBUS packet from the appropriate queue.
Figure 3.2: Verification flow for a single CPU transaction
A key feature of the verification environment, like the RTL design, is that it is highly
parameterized. We can easily configure features like address width, data width, cache size,
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length of a cache block, and number of cores. Parameters can be adjusted with no changes
to the test-bench infrastructure. Principles of modularity, re-use, and interoperability are
followed rigorously by adhering to UVM guidelines.
3.2 Verification Scenarios
A prudent verification plan is crucial for success in the first attempt. In the previous
section, we discussed the test-bench infrastructure and verification flow. In this section,
we describe critical features, verification methods and specific test cases identified during
the planning stage.
Table 3.4: Functions to be verified
Function Description
Basic connectivity Ensure that the input-output interface is functional.
IO protocol adherence Design should adhere to the input-output protocol as specified
Read to I-cache Read operation to the instruction cache
Write to I-cache Write operation to instruction cache should be ignored
Read to D-cache Data cache must supply appropriate data to the CPU
Write to D-cache Data should be written to the correct address
PLRU I-cache Pseudo LRU replacement policy must be followed by the in-
struction cache
PLRU D-cache Pseudo LRU replacement policy must be accurate in the data
cache operation
MESI protocol Cache should respond/send messages on the system bus as ne-
cessitated by the MESI protocol (data cache only)
Detailed design specification, provided in Appendix A, is treated as the golden refer-
ence. The level-1 multi-core cache design is the main focus of our verification effort. We
assume that the level-2 cache (LLC), the arbiter and memory are bug-free behavioral de-
scriptions. As mentioned earlier, both the design and verification environment are param-
eterized for a flexible number of cores. We concentrate on a 4-core RTL block comprising
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of four uni-core cache instantiations. We do not sub-divide the process into different lev-
els of verification. We verify the complete RTL block as one single entity. However,
particular test cases would focus only on the functionality of a uni-core cache. We adopt a
Grey-box approach in this endeavor, by tapping into few signals internal to the multi-core
block. Stimulus is pseudo-random, as scenarios are predominantly pseudo-random with a
few directed test cases.
Features identified as crucial for verification are listed in Table 3.4. One or more
features are verified in each of the test scenarios described in Table 3.5. Amongst the
features, MESI operation is most challenging to verify and debug, due to the sheer number
of possibilities. A total of 22 test scenarios were planned and executed. The primary cache
and the snooping caches involved were randomized for every test.
Table 3.5: Test scenarios with description
No. Scenario Description
1 Read miss I-cache - Initiate a read request to a block not present in the
instruction cache
2 Read hit I-cache - Initiate a read request to an instruction block
- Wait for the data to arrive in cache
- Initiate a read request to the same block
3 Write miss I-cache - Initiate a write request to a block not present in the
instruction cache
4 Write hit I-cache - Initiate a read request to an instruction block
- Wait for the data to arrive in cache
- Initiate a write request to the same block
5 Read miss D-cache
serviced by L2
- Initiate a read request to a block not present in the data
cache of any processor
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Table 3.5: Continued
No. Scenario Description
6 Read miss D-cache
serviced by another
core’s cache
- Read request to a block on the secondary CPU-1
Case 1: Snoop cache is in M
* Write request to block on secondary CPU-1
Case 2: Snoop cache is in E
* Do nothing
Case 3: Snoop cache is in S
* Read request to block on secondary CPU-2
- Read request on primary CPU to the same block
7 Read hit D-cache -Read request to a data block on primary CPU
Case 1: Primary cache is in M
* Write request to this block on primary CPU
Case 2: Primary cache is in E
* Do nothing; block already in E state
Case 3: Primary cache is in S
* Read request to this block on secondary CPU
- Read request on primary Proc to the same block
8 Write miss D-cache - Select a case randomly
Case 1: Secondary CPU cache is in I
* Do nothing
Case 2: Secondary CPU cache is in M
* Write request to the block on secondary CPU
Case 3: Secondary CPU cache is in E
* Read request to the block on secondary CPU
Case 4: Secondary CPU cache is in S
* Read request on primary and secondary CPUs
* Evict the block from primary cache
- Write request to block on the primary CPU
9 Write hit D-cache - Select a case randomly
Case 1: primary CPU cache is in M
* Write request to the data block
Case 2: primary CPU cache is in S
* Read request on both primary and secondary CPU
Case 3: primary CPU cache is in E
* Read request to the data block
- Write request on primary CPU to the same block.
10 LRU read I-cache - Initiate read requests R1-R8 to 8 instruction blocks of
the same set index, ensure that at least 5 of these blocks
are unique
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Table 3.5: Continued
No. Scenario Description
11 LRU read D-cache - Initiate read requests R1-R8 to 8 data blocks of the
same set index, ensure that at least 5 of these blocks are
unique
12 LRU write D-cache - Initiate read/write operations A1-A8 to 8 data blocks
of the same set index, ensure that at least 5 of these
blocks are unique and that the last 4 accesses are write
operations
13 Snoop BusRd request - Randomly select a case
Case 1: Primary CPU cache is in I
* Do nothing
Case 2: Primary CPU cache is in E
* Read request to the block of interest on primary
Case 3: Primary CPU cache is in M
* Write request to the block of interest on primary
Case 4: Primary CPU cache is in S
* Read request to the block on secondary CPU
* Read request to the block on primary CPU
* Evict the block of interest on secondary CPU
- Read request on the secondary CPU for the block
- Confirm the state transition in primary cache
14 Snoop BusRdx re-
quest
- Randomly select a case
Case 1: Primary CPU cache is in I
* Do nothing
Case 2: Primary CPU cache is in E
* Read request to the block of interest on primary
Case 3: Primary CPU cache is in M
* Write request to the block of interest on primary
Case 4: Primary CPU cache is in S
* Read request to the block on secondary CPU
* Read request to the block on primary CPU
* Evict the block of interest on secondary CPU
- Write request on the secondary CPU for the block
- Confirm the state transition in primary cache
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Table 3.5: Continued
No. Scenario Description
15 Snoop Invalidate re-
quest
- Read request to block on the secondary CPU
- Read request to block on the primary CPU
- Randomly select a case
Case 1: Primary CPU cache does not have the block
* Evict the block from primary cache
Case 2: Primary CPU cache is in S
* Do nothing; already in S
- Write request on the secondary CPU
- Confirm the state transition in primary cache
16 Simultaneous read - Read request on all CPUs for the same address con-
currently
17 Simultaneous write - Write request on all CPUs for the same address con-
currently
18 Round robin write Generate following sequence to same data block:
- Read 0, Read 1, Read 2, Read 3
- Write 0, Read 1, Write 2, Read 3
- Write 1, Read 0, Write 3, Read 2
- Write 0, Write 1, Write 2, Write 3
- Read 0, Read 1, Read 2, Read 3
19 Random single set - 100 random requests to the same set on all CPUs
- Randomize between read and write requests
20 Random test - 100 random requests on all CPUs
- Randomize between read and write requests
- Restrict access to two random sets
21 Random delay test - 100 random requests on all CPUs
- Randomize between read and write requests
- Restrict access to two random sets
- Randomize delay between requests
22 Random six address - 100 random requests on all CPUs
- Randomize between read and write requests
- Restrict access to 6 addresses within the same set
- Randomize delay between requests
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3.3 Checkers
Two broad classes of checkers are employed in this project, namely SystemVerilog
assertions (SVA) and transaction-level checks. In general, assertions could either be im-
mediate or concurrent [27]. Since concurrent SVA is suitable for both static and dynamic
verification [27], we commit to concurrent assertions for communication protocol checks.
The input-output interface verification depends on accurate properties. These assertions
are housed within the CPU monitor, system bus monitor, and interface files. The most
significant advantage of assertions is that failures are close to the source of error. It is easy
to narrow-down the root cause of the bug. However, a disadvantage of SVA is that scope
and expressiveness are limited. Therefore, it is challenging to define high-level checks as
assertions without additional SV code.
The simulation effort in our project preceded the formal endeavor. As a result, asser-
tions used in initial stages of simulation are used as the starting point for formal property
verification (FPV) described in Chapter 4. Nonetheless, several assertions and assump-
tions were defined on-the-fly during the FPV process. These additional properties were
added to the simulation effort gradually. All the assertions used in simulation are indi-
cated in Appendix B. It is important to note that while properties assist in simulation
debug, they can significantly increase the run-time of test-cases.
High-level checkers, included in the scoreboard, verify transaction level accuracy in
comparison with the cache reference model. DUV outputs can be categorized into 1)
data returned to the CPU and 2) messages relayed on the system bus for coherence. We
incorporate two checkers, one for each class of DUV outputs. The typical flow for score-
boarding is indicated in Figure 3.2. High-level checks are triggered by the arrival of a
CPU monitor packet in the scoreboard. Expected data is compared with the observed data
in the CPU packet for a read operation. Expected system bus activity is compared with
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the observed SBUS packet. High-level checks engulf a major portion of the functionality.
They are capable of verifying a wide range of behavior. However, high-level symptoms
are observed several thousand cycles after the root cause of the failure. As a result, it is
challenging to debug with merely transaction-level checking.
In summary, we verify our implementation with the below mentioned checkers:
SystemVerilog assertions: Concurrent assertions capture essential properties of the com-
munication protocol interface.
Data integrity check: Data is compared in the scoreboard against the reference model.
System bus activity check: Messages on the common shared bus are crucial for coher-
ence. Activity on the bus is compared against the expected transactions determined
by the reference model.
3.4 Coverage Goals
Verification completeness is accessed by a combination of factors like coverage, bug
discovery rate, and test-case pass percentage. Verification closure also depends on sev-
eral business parameters like time-to-market, IC application, risk involved, cost of re-spin,
etc. Generally, it is easy to identify additional subtle design discrepancies with extra ef-
fort and time. Therefore, it is crucial that the owner/manager decides the right trade-off
point between engineering effort and return-on-investment (ROI). Coverage is the most
crucial indicator of verification progress [24, 25, 29]. We must define coverage goals dur-
ing the planning stage, to prevent critical design failures in silicon. However, occasional
compromises are made with thorough discussions between all parties involved.
The fundamental principle of a metric-driven approach is to monitor well defined met-
rics like coverage, pass percentage and bug rate through the verification process. Coverage
is broadly classified into code coverage, and functional coverage. The tool implicitly cap-
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tures code coverage information from the regression results and RTL. Functional coverage,
on the other hand, is explicitly defined by the verification team.
Figure 3.3: Coverage as an indication of verification completeness
Figure 3.3 illustrates progress as a function of code and functional coverage. If both
coverage metrics are low, the project is mostly in the early stages with several weeks of
work remaining. A high functional coverage coupled with low code coverage indicates the
possibility of either dead RTL code and/or poor functional coverage definition. Significant
portion of the RTL can be rendered irrelevant if a particular feature is disabled in a legacy
IP. In such a scenario, the team must take steps to waive dead code and improve coverage
definition. A situation with low functional, but high code coverage indicates that stimulus
and behavior is limited. Another possibility is that the design is incomplete. If efforts
do not yield any improvement in metrics, it would be wise to try formal tools to elimi-
nate unreachable coverage. The ideal case is one with high code and sufficient functional
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coverage. In such a case, the team can call verification closure in consultation with other
metrics like bug rate and test-case pass proportion.
In this work, we strive to achieve code and functional coverage beyond 99% with suit-
able waivers. We define elaborate coverage collectors within the CPU monitor and SBUS
UVC to capture the entire gamut of possible legal behaviors. Code coverage incorporates
line, block, expression, FSM and toggle coverage.
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4. FORMAL VERIFICATION
The class of formal methods encompasses several mathematical techniques which for-
mally analyze the state space of a design [1]. A stark difference from simulation is that
specific input stimulus is not supplied to the design under verification (DUV). In simu-
lation, the test-bench continuously drives active values to the DUV, while monitoring the
outputs. Therefore, a given execution can merely verify the design for that specific input
combination. However, formal techniques ideally verify the design for all possible legal
input values subject to assumptions, which constrain the inputs to legal behavior, and ini-
tialization, which is required to determine the legal reset states. This point is illustrated in
Figure 4.1. Consider the circle to represent the legal state space of the DUV, simulation
can merely provide spot coverage. State of the DUV is comprised of all state elements
(flip-flops and latches), and inputs. Each simulation scenario when executed covers a sin-
gle point on the design’s state space. Formal analysis ideally promises full coverage of
the entire problem space, but in reality due to capacity limitations, it is often only possible
to validate critical subsets of the entire state space. This can be achieved by performing
bounded model checking, abstraction, or other complexity reduction means. In this chap-
ter, we briefly describe popular formal techniques, and their typical usage models. Then
we proceed to explain our approach to formally verify the MESI cache design.
Broadly, formal methods can be categorized into three classes, namely:
Formal Property Verification (FPV): The use of formal tools to prove assertions iden-
tified from the specification. This technique, based on state space enumeration, is
also known as model checking.
Formal Equivalence Verification (FEV): This technique is used to compare two mod-
els and determine their equivalence. A standard requirement in the digital design
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Figure 4.1: Motivation for formal verification
industry is to prove equivalence between the netlist and RTL or two different netlist
versions.
Theorem Proving: This technique uses a set of specified, required properties (assertions)
about a design to verify that these properties are satisfied by the implementation. A
difference from model checking is that universal and existential qualification can be
used to verify properties for any size of the design. Techniques used are also distinct;
theorem provers use logic deduction, rewriting techniques and decision procedures
to prove that the properties always hold true. Once these properties are verified, they
become theorems about the implementation.
Model checking and formal equivalence verification are most relevant to the realm of
hardware verification. Theorem proving techniques are sparingly used in digital design.
In this work, we primarily focus on formal property verification of a MESI cache con-
troller using model checking techniques. We begin with an initial specification and a toy
RTL implementation of the multi-core cache, which is hereby referred to as initial design.
We perform full proof FPV of the snooping cache design implemented in SystemVerilog
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using efficient complexity reduction techniques. The initial design has several limitations
like lack of parameterization, absence of a reset signal, and the presence of in-out ports.
We overcome these limitations and other design flaws during the verification process to
produce a robust design. Parameterization is critical to enable re-use, and modularity. Ad-
ditionally, it facilitates structural abstraction, thereby permitting formal analysis of large,
complex designs like a cache controller. In this chapter, we describe in detail the process
and techniques used to make formal property verification of our RTL design feasible.
Formal equivalence checking is widely adopted during the synthesis of digital circuits.
A downside of FEV is that it requires a reference model which we trust is correct and
portrays the exact same behavior as the implementation (DUV). It is commonplace to
witness FEV of an RTL model and a synthesized netlist. In this study, we adopt FEV
to verify parameterization of our cache design. We demonstrate the use of equivalence
checking as a useful tool during the front-end design phase. This effort is described in
Section 4.2. Due to time limitations, we were unable to explore the uses and implications
of theorem proving. Therefore, we include it as proposed future work in Section 6.1.
4.1 Formal Property Verification
Under this technique, design specification is described as a set of properties either in
SystemVerilog or PSL (Property Specification Language). FPV, also popularly known as
assertion-based verification (ABV), is essentially a method to prove that these properties
hold for all legal input combinations and resulting reachable states for those inputs [31].
The generic flow of an FPV effort is indicated as Figure 4.2 [1]. The inputs to FPV are
an RTL model, a set of properties to be proven, and a set of constraints. Assertions and
cover statements form the set of properties which are required to be proven. An assertion
is a statement about the design that is expected to always be true [1]. A cover point is
a statement that describes an interesting condition or behavior about the design. It is
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expected to be true occasionally, with a minimum of one occurrence. Assumptions along
with clock and reset definitions constitute the set of constraints. Assumptions, similar
to assertions, represent behavior that is universally true. In contrast to assertions, which
describe DUV behavior, assumptions define the verification environment.
FPV uses a set of techniques to identify reachable states, and subsequently, verifies
that the defined properties hold true in all reachable states. Traditional state enumeration
technique uses an algorithm, like breadth first search, to calculate the reachable states. It
continues enumeration until no additional states can be reached. Bounded model checking,
on the other hand, uses different techniques. The most successful bounded model check-
ing algorithm effectively converts the sequential design into a combinational circuit by
unrolling it to bound k. Once unrolled, a satisfiability check is performed to determine if
the properties are satisfied. Additionally, model checking uses satisfiability modulo theory
(SMT) solvers, rewrite techniques and combinations of different algorithms. Post analysis,
the model checking tool provides three plausible outputs for each property, namely proof,
disproved/unreachable result, inconclusive or bounded proof. The list of proven properties
includes proven assertions and unreachable cover statements. Every disproved assertion
is supplemented with a counter-example waveform illustrating a failure scenario. Each
reachable cover point provides a reachability trace describing the scenario in which the
cover statement is achieved. An inconclusive or bounded proof indicates that the property
was verified for a limited number of clock cycles from reset state.
Ideally, an FPV exercise aims to prove all assertions and strives to reach all valid cover
statements. In such a scenario, engineers should review the proof environment to ensure
that the design is not over constrained. In case of counter-examples and unreachable prop-
erties, manual debug effort is invested to identify the source of failure. Either the design is
updated or constraints are refined to eliminate the failure. Nevertheless, inconclusive re-
sults are also useful as they signify partial success. If the bound on the result is sufficiently
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Figure 4.2: FPV tool execution. Reprinted from [1]
high, we can conditionally declare success as a counter-example could not be identified.
Property verification is not restricted to any given phase of the design flow. It serves as
a generic tool providing numerous capabilities to interact with the implementation. Typical
usage models of formal property verification are listed below [1].
1. Early design exercise FPV: Model checking can be used to gain insight into the
initial functionality of the design. It can provide an instant test-bench to detect initial
stage design flaws [32]. This exercise serves as a sanity check before the design is
modified or released to the full fledged verification team.
2. Bug hunting FPV: Property verification is extremely powerful in detecting corner
cases. Therefore, it could be used in collaboration with a simulation based approach.
Specific high risk features are described as necessary properties and bugs are de-
tected as counter example traces of the defined assertions.
3. Full proof FPV: Property verification could also serve as a complete replacement to
simulation-based verification. In this usage model, the specification is fully defined
as properties. Proof of the properties for all possible design states would imply that
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the design conforms to the specification. This is the ideal usage model envisioned
by the pioneers of formal verification. However, full proof FPV is infeasible for a
majority of designs due to state space explosion and complexity.
4. Specialized FPV: Model checking is often applied to specific problems in the digital
design cycle. A few examples include unreachable coverage elimination, connectiv-
ity [33], post-silicon debug [34], and protocol verification.
Our primary goal is to achieve full-proof verification of the cache module, with focus
on the communication interface and coherence. Nonetheless, we explore opportunities to
leverage other FPV usage models along the process of full-proof verification. Specifically,
we also focus on FPV during bug fixes, unreachable coverage elimination, and FPV to
understand legacy designs.
4.1.1 Verification Plan
A well-thought out plan is the first crucial step to a successful FPV endeavor. It is
necessary to explicitly outline the objectives of the verification process. In this section, we
describe our plan in terms of properties, verification levels, and completion criteria.
A brief summary of the formal verification plan is captured in Table 4.1. Our preferred
tool for formal analysis is JasperGold from Cadence Design Systems. The goal is to
verify coherence, consistency and the communication infrastructure. Cover statements are
required to capture all documented transactions and basic behavior. Assumptions must
limit the input space to legal combinations alone. Assertions, which are properties derived
directly from the design specification, are primarily concerned with coherence and the
input-output protocol.
The planned verification is staged into two-levels, namely uni-core and multi-core
modules. Firstly, we define properties for the uni-core design with meaningful assump-
tions imposed on the inputs from other cores. Next, we extend verification to the multi-
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Table 4.1: Formal verification plan
Goals Verify cache coherence and memory consistency
Verify the communication infrastructure (IO protocol)
Method Formal property verification (model checking)
Properties Cover-points:
Typical behavior and transactions
Assumptions:
Constraints on the inputs
Prevent illegal stimulus
Represent entire range of legal behavior
Assertions:
Single-write multiple-read invariant
Data value invariant
Communication interface assertions
Liveness guarantee
Staging plan
• Unicore module
- Single cache line
- Immediate bus access grant
- Pseudo-LRU operation
• Multi-core module
Complexity reduction
- Structural abstraction (parameterization)
- Free variables
- Memory abstraction
Exit criteria
Time limit
Quality of proof
Coverage
Bugs discovered
core module by converting uni-core assumptions into assertions. This technique ensures
that assumptions in the uni-core set-up do not over-constrain the design. The multi-core
environment would still require some constraints on its inputs coming from level-2 cache.
Additionally, verification of the uni-core module is staged in increasing order of complex-
ity. Simplifications are assumed in the initial stages to enable easy debug. First, we prove
the MESI invariants for a single cache line alone. Second, we do not consider the pseudo-
LRU algorithm in our verification scope. Third, we assume that the arbiter would grant
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bus access to our module immediately on the next cycle. These assumptions are excluded
gradually as we make verification progress. Thus, the final stage of uni-core FPV does not
include any presumptions.
The biggest threat to FPV is state space explosion. We employ effective complexity
reduction techniques to tackle the state space problem. We leverage parameters of our
design to reduce the size and make it tractable for JasperGold. Parameterized designs are
ideal to apply structural abstraction [35]. Additionally, we also utilize free variables and
memory abstraction within our formal analysis.
Simulation techniques usually decide process completion based on verification quality
parameters like coverage, regression status, bug rate and quality, and pass percentage.
Similarly, FPV completion can be analyzed as a combination of metrics. We set aside a
fixed time limit for our FPV effort. This is common practice in the industry as teams need
to meet aggressive time-to-market schedules. We analyze coverage, bugs discovered, and
quality of proof to declare verification completeness.
4.1.2 Cover Statements
Cover points are useful to demonstrate that the proof environment can support typical
behavior expected from the design. Statements would normally depend on the design-
under-verification and its most critical functionality. However, common conditions listed
below serve as good guidelines while defining effective cover points [1].
• Each waveform in the specification should map to a cover statement.
• Inputs and outputs must be capable of assuming all legal values in the environment.
• Every transaction type should be covered.
• Every state within the design is reachable.
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• Easily identifiable error case scenarios should be included.
A complete list of cover points for our design, identified with the above directives, is
provided in Appendix B.1. Abstract statements are converted into SystemVerilog cover
points before they are fed into JasperGold.
Often, cover statements are incorrectly treated as an afterthought for FPV. This is a
critical mistake as proven assertions do not have any significance if the FPV environment
prevents basic operations. An over-constrained environment could disallow typical trans-
actions on the DUV. Therefore, cover points are the primary focus during the initial stages
of FPV. In the nascent phase of FPV, assumptions are refined through an iterative pro-
cess, termed as wiggling the design. It is crucial to manually observe cover traces and
confirm functionality during the wiggling process. Subsequently, cover traces should be
analyzed every-time there is a change to the set of constraints. We rigorously follow the
aforementioned recommendation to ensure sanity of our FPV environment at every stage.
On the other extreme, engineers with a strong simulation background could easily
develop an affinity to cover statements, as they are strikingly similar to test scenarios. This
situation is equally undesirable as reachable statements can only guarantee a possibility
of good behavior. They do not verify good behavior under all circumstances. Therefore,
we should prevent cover statements from turning into a set of simulation test cases. The
ultimate focus of FPV is to prove assertions. This further reinforces the belief that formal
analysis requires a fundamentally different perspective when compared to simulation.
4.1.3 Complexity Staging
We subdivide the verification process into two levels, namely the uni-core module and
the multi-core module. As described earlier, the many-core module consists of multiple
instantiations of the uni-core block. First, we define a complete set of properties for the
uni-core module. Several assumptions are imposed to limit the input stimulus to legal
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combinations. Once cover statements and assertions are proven at the single core level, it is
crucial to validate the constraints utilized for FPV. If the set of assumptions over-constrain
the design space, our proof is incomplete. Constraints can be justified in several ways. We
could provide arguments from the input specification. Alternatively, we could assert the
constraints in a simulation regression suite, typically at a higher level of hierarchy (IP/SoC
level). In our case, we simply convert the uni-core assumptions into internal assertions in
the multi-core environment. As a result, the assumptions are automatically validated at the
next level of verification. Constraints in the multi-core environment, which are concerned
with signals coming from the level-2 cache and arbiter, are justified using arguments from
the design specification. All assumptions utilized in our FPV exercise are described in
Appendix B.2. We verify that all assertions are valid in the multi-core model as well.
This is necessary to reveal any concurrent behavior that was not present in the uni-core
model. Additionally, the multi-core model may contain deadlocks or livelocks which are
not present in the uni-core model.
Techniques to handle complexity in large designs can be classified into either under-
constraints or over-constraints. Under-constraining the design makes it more generic by
abstracting away intricate details. With a more generic design, we run the risk of false
negatives which demand greater debug effort, but false positives are impossible. Over-
constraining, on the other hand, makes the design more specific. Therefore, it can lead to
false positives. In other words, there is the possibility of a faulty design being declared
correct and functional. As a result, over-constraining the model is extremely risky and
needs to be justified.
Nonetheless, it is straight forward to debug and understand a simplified design, es-
pecially during the early stages of verification. A simple model with a limited set of
behavior can be obtained with over-constraints. Once we comprehend and debug a vari-
ety of transactions, we can gradually eliminate certain constraints to extend support for
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more complex behavior. Strict adherence to LRU operation is not critical to coherence or
consistency. Therefore, we exclude verification of pseudo-LRU functionality in all stages
to simplify our FPV effort. We execute uni-core module FPV in the below listed stages,
which increase in level of complexity.
1. Stage-1
In the simplest stage of FPV, we prove MESI transition assertions for a single cache
line. We assume that system bus access is granted to the module immediately.
Writes are restricted to data blocks alone. Additionally, a invalidate request is also
serviced immediately on the next clock cycle. We assume that data will be provided
on the shared bus within a fixed latency of 2 clock cycles. Assumptions specific to
stage-1 are listed in Appendix B.2.1.1.
2. Stage-2
In stage-2, we allow write operations to instruction cache, and verify that they are
not performed by the implementation. We prove the MESI assertions for all cache
lines. We increase the bus latency to 3 cycles. Assumptions specific to stage-2 are
listed in Appendix B.2.1.2.
3. Stage-3
In stage-3, we describe arbiter and level-2 behavior more accurately. We assume that
a level-1 cache is granted primary system bus access within 45 cycles. We arrived at
an estimate of 45 cycles, based on the realistic observation that each level-1 request
can take a maximum of 15 clock cycles. This is the theoretical worst case estimate
for a 4-core system, in which all other level-1 caches perform eviction and write
back before access is granted to our L1-cache of interest. Additionally, we place a
realistic assumption that snoop access is granted only for blocks present in modified
or exclusive states. Snoop grant may or may not be granted for a block in shared
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state. Based on observations in the multi-core FPV, we placed modified the bus
latency to a maximum of 9 clock cycles. Assumptions specific to stage-3 are listed
in Appendix B.2.1.3.
Clearly, the final stage of the uni-core FPV does not permit any over-constraining as
stage-3 constraints are realistic in the final implementation.
4.1.4 Assertions
The crux of formal property verification is the set of assertions. Assertions are derived
directly from the design specification. Goals of the FPV exercise dictate the number and
type of assertions. A design sanity FPV would be complete with limited assertions ensur-
ing basic behaviors alone. Similarly, it would suffice to describe risky features as prop-
erties for bug hunting FPV. However, a full-proof verification is expected to completely
replace simulation. Therefore, the complete specification is required to be captured as
SystemVerilog assertions.
Since the simulation effort preceded formal verification, we used assertions identified
for simulation as the starting point for FPV. Assertions from the UVM environment were
limited and mostly unsuitable for FPV. Hence, a significant effort was needed to develop
properties appropriate for FPV. It is occasionally acceptable to define assertions with in-
finite length sequences in simulation, but they are unsuitable for formal property verifi-
cation due to state space explosion. Similarly, MESI transition, memory coherence, and
some interface assertions are not required in the UVM environment due to the presence of
a reference model and elaborate monitors.
The set of properties used for our FPV is presented as Appendix B.3. We classify proof
targets based on the specific feature that they represent. We have the following categories
of assertions:
1. CPU-lv1 interface
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2. System bus interface
3. Bounded liveness properties
4. MESI state transitions
5. Coherence and memory consistency
6. Bug fix assertions
Appendix B provides complete detail of the covers, assumptions, and assertions. FPV
properties are stored in a separate module known as the verification component (VCOMP).
It is basically a SystemVerilog module with only input ports. All the cover statements, as-
sumptions and assertions are defined within this module in terms of its inputs. Finally, the
VCOMP is bound to the relevant design module with the ’bind’ directive in SystemVer-
ilog. Verification components separate FPV properties from the design. We can easily
void the bind directive in synthesis or simulation. Assertions embedded in the design,
when large in number, can delay simulation runs significantly. This is avoided with the
practice of encapsulating properties in a verification component.
4.1.5 Complexity Reduction Techniques
Formal techniques are inherently solving an NP-complete problem. Consider a design
with n state elements, which are either flip-flops or latches, and m input signals. State
of the design is comprised of both state elements and inputs. Theoretically, it could have
2(m+n) possible configurations in its state space. Therefore, even for reasonable values of
m and n, the formal task is challenging. Exponential growth in state space with increase
in design size is the main source of complexity in formal analysis. However, in practice,
only a portion of the entire design space can be reached from the reset state. Additionally,
the FPV tool only needs to analyze state in terms of the logic cone, also known as Cone
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of Influence (COI), of the property. These factors along with numerous advances in recent
years help enable formal analysis of large designs.
Despite improvements in formal technology, state space explosion still presents a ma-
jor hindrance to full scale adoption of formal methods [1]. Complexity issues are easily
identifiable. They typically show up as tool crashes, time-outs, memory blowups, and
bounded results. Clever techniques like abstraction, black-boxing, and cut-points are re-
quired to navigate complexity. In this section, we discuss techniques used to overcome
complexity issues encountered during FPV of our cache design.
4.1.5.1 Formal friendly properties
It is easy to describe the same property in numerous ways using SVA. Unlike the
Python programming language, SystemVerilog assertions allow various options to de-
scribe the exact same behavior. In order to facilitate formal analysis, we ensure that
properties are simple and small. Here, we describe specific examples of formal-averse
and formal-friendly properties for equivalent behavior.
Consider the properties shown below:
1 A1 : a s s e r t p r o p e r t y ( ( a | | b ) |−> c ) ;
2 A2 : a s s e r t p r o p e r t y ( d |−> ( e && f ) ) ;
We can easily re-write the above properties as multiple smaller assertions shown below.
This is most helpful when a, b, e and f are not boolean signals, but complex sequences.
1 F1_1 : a s s e r t p r o p e r t y ( a |−> c ) ;
2 F1_2 : a s s e r t p r o p e r t y ( b |−> c ) ;
3 F2_1 : a s s e r t p r o p e r t y ( d |−> e ) ;
4 F2_1 : a s s e r t p r o p e r t y ( d |−> f ) ;
On several instances in the uni-core module, we are required to assert that signal x
remains logic high until a rising edge of signal y is observed. We illustrate the formal-
averse property below:
1 A1 : a s s e r t p r o p e r t y ( $ r o s e ( x ) |= > x u n t i l $ r o s e ( y ) ) ;
Although the above property is natural and easy to understand, ’until’ keyword in
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SystemVerilog leads to problems in FV. Most simulation engineers are accustomed to
describe properties in the above coding style. We can represent the same behavior with a
formal-friendly, boolean assertion as shown below:
1 F1 : a s s e r t p r o p e r t y ( x && ! y |= > x ) ;
Similarly, in order to ensure that data is unchanged as long as data_valid remains high,
we can easily avoid the until directive by replacing A1 with F1 as shown below:
1 A1 : a s s e r t p r o p e r t y ( $ r o s e ( d a t a _ v a l i d ) |= > $ s t a b l e ( d a t a ) u n t i l $ f e l l ( d a t a _ v a l i d ) ) ;
1 F1 : a s s e r t p r o p e r t y ( d a t a _ v a l i d |= > ( ! d a t a _ v a l i d | | $ s t a b l e ( d a t a ) ) ) ;
Liveness properties are the hardest to prove in FPV. Typically, they result in infinite
length sequences which triggers the state explosion problem. Therefore, it is immensely
helpful to re-write liveness using finite length properties as real world systems are ex-
pected to respond in finite time. In order to guarantee that every CPU read operation
eventually obtains a response, we could inefficiently define an infinite length assertion as
shown below.
1 A1 : a s s e r t p r o p e r t y ( $ r o s e ( cpu_rd ) |−> s _ e v e n t u a l l y ( d a t a _ v a l i d ) ) ;
Analysis is easier for the FPV tool if we guesstimate a worst case latency for the CPU
read operation as described below:
1 F1 : a s s e r t p r o p e r t y ( $ r o s e ( cpu_rd ) |−> # # [ 1 : 5 0 ] $ r o s e ( d a t a _ v a l i d ) ) ;
In summary, we followed the below principles to enable easier analysis:
1. Divide complex behaviors into small, simple properties
2. Perform boolean simplifications whenever possible
3. Avoid directives like until, s_eventually, and throughout
4. Make liveness properties finite
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Inefficient coding does not merely apply to assertions alone. Assumptions, which are
coded in a formal-averse manner, can cause greater damage as they appear in the fan-in
of several assertions. A poorly coded assertion affects only itself, but a badly written
assumption can affect several properties.
4.1.5.2 Auxiliary code
Assertion languages have limited scope and expressiveness. It is impossible to define
overlapping behavior in SVA. For instance, consider the requirement that every pulse on a
’request’ signal should be acknowledged by a corresponding pulse on signal ’ack’ within
4-8 cycles. We cannot define assertions to fully capture this condition. Therefore, we
utilize auxiliary SV code which keeps track of pending requests. Supplementary SV code
is embedded in the verification component module in order to keep it isolated from the
design.
Additionally, certain behaviors are extremely complex to be described in SVA alone.
FPV can benefit immensely with the additional of SV code for such scenarios. Auxiliary
code simplifies the properties, making analysis easier for the FPV tool. Therefore, we of-
ten use additional SV code within our verification component to facilitate FPV. Typically,
auxiliary code is in the form of finite state machines and counters. One particular example
is the behavior of the round-robin arbiter in our system. Assumptions which characterize
the behavior of our round-robin arbiter, are possible only with auxiliary code which re-
members the number of grants provided to other L1 caches. Reference models for data
coherence, described in the next section, are a special case of auxiliary code.
4.1.5.3 Reference models
Reference models convert a portion of the FPV exercise into formal equivalence verifi-
cation. Complex assertions, defined on internals signals within the DUV, are transformed
into a direct comparison between the RTL and the reference model. As a result, they
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increase the capacity of the FPV tool.
Within the purview of our FPV exercise, we define a reference model to assist the co-
herence assertions described in Appendix B.3.1.5. This model simply maintains a copy of
valid data for the entire address space. Within the assertions, it suffices to compare our
copy of valid data with the model outputs. Despite its benefits, we should exercise re-
straint and avoid excessive use of auxiliary code. It is inefficient to recreate large, intricate
portions of RTL within the verification component. With excessive SV code, we run the
risk of false positives, due to bugs present in both the reference model and the RTL.
4.1.5.4 Parameterization
Structural abstraction is the most significant and straight forward method to reduce
complexity. If the design is parameterized, we can easily simplify a large data-path or
complex structure. Consider the case of a wide data bus with the same logic for every data
bit. We can minimize the width to a single bit and still maintain confidence in FPV.
Within the purview of our design, we exercise SystemVerilog parameters to make FPV
feasible on our implementation. We reduce the address width to 7 bits, L1 cache size to
64 bits, number of cache sets to 4, and address tag to 3 bits. This decision was the biggest
enabling factor for our FPV effort. Almost all the properties were inconclusive when FPV
was performed on the full-size design. Despite the massive reduction in design size, we
can theoretically argue that all behaviors possible in the original size design are retained
in the reduced model. For instance, if we minimized the design to consist of single cache
set, we could clearly point out complex behavior that is improbable in the reduced model.
Parameterization can be made complete by using induction to prove from the base case,
that the arbitrary general parameterized model is correct.
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4.1.5.5 Free variables
Free variables, similar to primary inputs, can be assigned arbitrary values by the FPV
engine subject to imposed constraints. A free variable is typically added to facilitate for-
mal verification when the model contains significant amount of symmetry [1]. In such a
scenario, we can exploit free variables to generalize formal analysis. Different cases ex-
ercising similar logic is combined and verified by a single assertion rather than separate
properties.
In our FPV effort, we introduce a free variable to represent cache line number, by
declaring a new variable within the verification component. Without the concept of free
variables, MESI protocol assertions are realized with the help of a generate statement as
shown below:
1 parameter NUMBER_OF_CACHE_LINES = 1 6 ;
2 g e n e r a t e f o r ( genvar i =0 ; i <NUMBER_OF_CACHE_LINES ; i ++) begin
3 A1 : a s s e r t p r o p e r t y M E S I _ a s s e r t i o n ( i ) ;
4 . . . .
5 end
6 endgenerate
The above code snippet would create 16 instances of MESI assertions, one for each
cache line. Similar logic is verified in slightly different versions of the same assertion,
resulting in a lot of inefficiency. With the addition of a new free variable, we can generalize
analysis for all the cache lines. Therefore, we rewrite assertion A1 as shown below to
exploit symmetry within the design.
1 parameter NUMBER_OF_CACHE_LINES = 1 6 ;
2 i n t f r e e _ i ; / / f r e e v a r i a b l e
3 U1 : assume p r o p e r t y ( f r e e _ i >=0 && f r e e _ i < NUMBER_OF_CACHE_LINES) ;
4 U2 : assume p r o p e r t y (##1 $ s t a b l e ( f r e e _ i ) )
5 A1 : a s s e r t p r o p e r t y M E S I _ a s s e r t i o n ( f r e e _ i ) ;
6 . . . .
Here, variable ’free_i’ can take any of the 16 legal values, thereby forcing a broader
analysis of the assertion. The FPV tool can exploit symmetry and similarity in logic to
prove the assertion for all cache lines at once. Restrictions on the free variable are ex-
tremely significant and need to be justified. Here, we simply impose constraints on the
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new variable to take on legal values and remain constant throughout a trace execution.
Nevertheless, introduction of free variables is a double-edged sword. If we combine com-
pletely dissimilar logic with the help of a new variable, tool efficiency would decrease
significantly.
4.1.5.6 Memory abstraction
Large memories, queues and counters are the most problematic structures for formal
verification. They are often replaced by abstract models to facilitate effective analysis.
Black-boxing, cut-points, and free variables can be considered simple forms of abstrac-
tion. Essentially, we retain only a significant portion of the model, while abstracting away
intricate details.
Our cache implementation has a large memory, but this is already handled with pa-
rameterization. However, within the verification component, we are required to accurately
recreate behavior of the level-2 cache and main memory. Even in the minimal system,
level-2 cache is required to hold values of 32 blocks each 4-bit wide. We cannot obtain
FPV proof results without an accurate assumptions on outputs of the level-2 cache. This
is made possible through simple memory abstraction technique. Auxiliary code within the
verification component adds to state space problem as well. Thus, memory abstraction of
level-2 cache is crucial to our FPV effort.
We replace a full-capacity level-2 model with a small set of interesting locations. Using
free variables, we restrict access to a maximum of ten different locations in one execution-
trace. This significantly reduces complexity as we track only 10 blocks within the veri-
fication module. This is a reasonable assumption, as no interesting behavior is excluded.
In general, abstraction is not a fool proof method, it is capable of over-constraining the
design, which in turn can lead to false positives.
49
4.2 Formal Equivalence Verification
Formal equivalence verification (FEV) is the mathematical process of proving two
distinct models to be logically equivalent. These two models are typically referred to as the
specification (SPEC) and the implementation (IMP). Specification, generally more abstract
as compared to IMP, is either an RTL description, a high-level model, or a synthesized
netlist. Implementation, which is more concrete, could be an updated RTL specification
or an optimized netlist. Several notions of equivalence exist depending on the points of
comparison between the two models. Aspects of the two modules which form the basis of
comparison are known as key-points. Common key-points include inputs, outputs, state
elements, and cut-points [1].
On the basis of the definition of equivalence, FEV can be classified into the following
categories [1]:
1. Combinational Equivalence:
Combinational equivalence, also known as state-matching equivalence, is the most
mature FEV technique [36]. Key-points for this method include inputs, outputs
and all state elements. The two models are expected to have equivalent internal
states given the same input stimulus. This is easiest form of equivalence in terms
of analysis, as the tool can treat state elements as cut points. It is only required
to compare combinational logic between flip-flops and latches. A huge limitation
of state-matching is that even minor changes in structure can disrupt equivalence.
Despite this limitation, combinational equivalence is the norm in synthesis of dig-
ital designs. The synthesized netlist is expected to be state equivalent to the RTL
implementation.
2. Sequential Equivalence:
Two models are known to be cycle-accurate or sequentially equivalent if their out-
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puts match on every clock cycle given the same set of inputs [37]. Key-points for
comparison are comprised of only primary outputs. Despite changes to state repre-
sentation, pipeline depth, and internal timing protocols, sequential equivalence can
verify equivalent designs.
3. Transactional Equivalence:
Transactional equivalence is a relatively nascent technology used to compare be-
tween a highly abstract model and an RTL implementation. The high level model is
not cycle-accurate but rather transaction accurate [38]. In other words, comparison
is performed at the boundaries of defined transactions. This definition of equiva-
lence is more generic as compared to earlier notions. However, it is also the most
challenging form of FEV.
At its core, FEV is similar in several aspects to FPV. In the absence of a dedicated FEV
tool, we can perform equivalence verification by defining properties that assert equivalent
key-points. The typical FEV execution flow is depicted in Figure 4.3. Inputs to the FEV
tool include input constraints, the two models for comparison and key-point mappings.
Outputs from the FEV tool are one of three possibilities, namely proven equivalence, in-
conclusive, or an inequality. If inequality is established, a counter-example is provided for
the scenario that captures the difference.
Common usage models for FEV are described below [1, 39]:
• RTL vs netlist equivalence
During logic synthesis, the synthesized netlist is often compared against the original
RTL for functionality. Combinational equivalence with is generally used for this
exercise.
• Verification of parameterization
Adding configurable parameters to a legacy design is a risky affair. Designers of-
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Figure 4.3: Typical FEV execution
ten fear that basic functionality could be disrupted in the process. Combinational
FEV is an easy check to ensure that functionality in the default configuration is pre-
served. The non-parameterized model is compared against the parameterized model
in default configuration. However, FEV does not comment about functionality in
a new configuration. In other words, it does not guarantee that parameterization is
complete and successful. Induction proofs can be used to completely verify param-
eterization.
• Validating timing fixes
Timing changes are often performed late in the design cycle. Techniques to ease
timing include logic distribution, and critical path reduction. Simple sequential FEV
allays fears of a broken design.
• Chicken bit validation
Late in the design process, de-feature (chicken) bits are added to disable design
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changes with low confidence. FEV can provide peace of mind by proving equiva-
lence between the stable design and updated design with chicken bit enabled.
• Clock gating verification
Clock gating is an important power reduction technique, which is capable of disrupt-
ing functionality late in the design process. Proving equivalence between original
and gated implementations prevents the addition of undesirable failures.
With reference to our study, we could not comprehensively investigate the application
of FEV techniques to our design due to limited resources and time. However, as a simple
case study, we proved equivalence between the initial unparameterized design and the up-
dated, configurable implementation. The legacy design did not facilitate a flexible number
of cores. We added this feature to the module and ensured equivalence for the default con-
figuration of 4 cores. This was performed using the JasperGold Sequential Equivalence
Checking (SEC) application. Although this exercise was trivial enough to be realized in a
few minutes, it demonstrates the effectiveness of FEV during design updates as described
earlier in this section. It reinforces our belief that formal techniques serve as a generic
tool-kit with numerous opportunities to interact with the RTL implementation.
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5. RESULTS
In this chapter, we present results obtained using the two verification techniques. We
describe the metrics used to analyze progress in simulation and formal methods. Addi-
tionally, critical design changes made to fix deviations from the specification are reported
under each technique. A vital coherence issue, due to contention between CPU and snoop-
side requests, was identified in formal analysis. This led to a significant revamp of the
micro-architecture, which is detailed in Section 5.2.2. The tools, and infrastructure used
in each approach are summarized in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Infrastructure for verification
UVM Environment Formal Verification
Language SystemVerilog and UVM SystemVerilog Assertions
Tool(s)
Cadence Irun
SimVision
VManager
Incisive Metrics Center
Cadence JasperGold FPV App
Cadence JasperGold SEC App
Machine
Dell PowerEdge R815
4 AMD Opteron 6174 Processors (48 2.2 GHz cores)
256 GB main memory
CentOS 5.7 x86_64
5.1 UVM Environment
The system parameters used within the UVM environment is the original design intent,
which is 32-bit address, 32-bit instruction and data blocks, and a 4-core configuration.
Level-1 cache has the following settings: 16-bit address tag, 14-bit set index, 2-bit offset,
2 Kilo-Bytes each for data and instructions, and 4-way set associative. Level-2 cache is
8-way set associative model with a unified capacity of 8 Mega-Bytes. However, a reduced
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size configuration, equivalent to that used in the formal technique, is also analyzed in the
UVM environment. This is possible due to the flexible nature of our UVM test-bench. It
ensures that functionality is not lost in the reduced configuration. Results obtained from
the minimal parameters are clearly specified with the label ’RC’.
Table 5.2: Time-line of verification progress
Date Infrastructure
developed (%)
Test-cases
developed
Test-cases
passing
Pass rate
(%)
28-Oct-16 0 0 0 N/A
04-Nov-16 20 0 0 N/A
11-Nov-16 40 6 3 50.00
12-Nov-16 70 15 8 53.33
13-Nov-16 75 16 16 100.00
25-Nov-16 80 16 16 100.00
01-Dec-16 95 16 16 100.00
02-Dec-16 100 21 18 85.71
04-Dec-16 100 22 21 95.45
08-Jan-17 100 22 21 95.45
10-Jan-17 100 22 22 100.00
14-Apr-16 100 22 21 95.45
12-May-17 100 22 21 95.45
19-May-17 100 22 22 100.00
We successfully developed the necessary infrastructure and executed the verification
plan outlined in Chapter 3. The execution timeline is presented as Table 5.2. It describes
the number of test-cases coded and passing with a single fixed seed. Additionally, an
estimate of infrastructure development is provided. At the close of our project, we were
able to execute all test scenarios without any failures.
We developed a regression suite consisting of 22 test-cases, each verified over hundred
random seeds. Progress in the regression suite is depicted in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 for the
original and minimized (RC) configurations respectively. A graphical illustration of the
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Table 5.3: Status of regression suite for original design parameters
Date Test-cases run Test-cases passing Pass rate (%)
11-Nov-16 6 3 50.00
12-Nov-16 180 167 92.78
13-Nov-16 320 320 100.00
01-Dec-16 1600 1600 100.00
02-Dec-16 2100 1987 94.62
04-Dec-16 2200 2119 96.32
08-Jan-17 110 97 88.18
10-Jan-17 110 104 94.55
12-May-17 440 407 92.50
19-May-17 440 440 100.00
26-May-17 2200 2200 100.00
02-Jun-17 2200 2200 100.00
09-Jun-17 2200 2200 100.00
Table 5.4: Status of regression suite for reduced design parameters (RC)
Date Test-cases run Test-cases passing Pass rate (%)
14-Apr-17 440 414 94.09
12-May-17 440 418 95.00
19-May-17 440 440 100.00
26-May-17 2200 2200 100.00
02-Jun-17 2200 2200 100.00
pass rate is provided as Figure 5.1. We notice the presence of a blocking bug in early
December 2016, which led to several regression failures. The source of these failures was
identified to be contention between the processor and snoop-side requests. Simultaneous
requests to the same address block from the CPU and system bus, led to several failures. In
order to diagnose and device a solution to this concurrency issue, we reduced the number
of random seeds to 5, resulting in a total of 110 test cases in the suite. Although, this issue
was identified in simulation, we failed to define a suitable solution in spite of numerous
attempts. We were able to reduce the failure rate occasionally, but failed to eliminate
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the error completely. This was because errors cropped up only in random tests, which
had a substantially large simulation time. It was challenging to isolate the failure causing
transactions from irrelevant transactions. Finally, a definitive solution was identified in
formal analysis, as described in Section 5.2.2. Once this fix was implemented, we switched
to hundred random seeds and obtained complete success in our regression suite.
Figure 5.1: Pass rate based on regression suite
Critical bugs identified and fixed in simulation are described in Section 5.1.1. There-
after, coverage metrics are provided in Section 5.1.2.
5.1.1 Bugs Discovered
A total of 13 bugs were discovered, and 12 were fixed using the UVM simulation
framework. An important point to note is that preliminary verification was already per-
formed on the legacy design, similar to how designers sanity check RTL prior to release
to the verification team. As a result, most trivial bugs were eliminated before creation of
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the UVM framework.
5.1.1.1 Signal cp_in_cache de-asserted during bus_rd_snoop
Consider a scenario in which data block A is present in L1-cache0, which services
CPU0. In response to an incoming snoop side bus_rd_snoop request from L1-cache1 for
block A, L1-cache0 should respond by asserting signals cp_in_cache and shared_local.
Signal shared_local was asserted but cp_in_cache remained low. This is corrected by a
minor fix to the RTL of the main functional cache block.
5.1.1.2 Signal cp_in_cache de-asserted during bus_rdx_snoop
Consider the behavior in the previous bug, but for an incoming bus_rdx_snoop request
This flaw is fixed by a minor correction to the RTL.
5.1.1.3 Signal shared_local not generated for modified snoop block hit
Imagine a situation in which data block A exists in modified state in L1-cache0. A
read operation by CPU1, initiates a bus_rd request from L1-cache1. L1-cache0 observes
the bus read request and performs write-back of block A. Once level-2 write is success-
ful, L1-cache0 should supply block A to L1-cache1 with the shared_local signal enabled
to indicate that the block is shared. However, the implementation incorrectly drives the
shared_local signal low when data is provided to L1-cache1 on the system bus. A simple
fix resolved the issue.
5.1.1.4 Incorrect LRU replacement
When the LRU state variable is 3’b1x1, way-3 should be replaced from the cache set,
according to the specification. Our legacy implementation incorrectly evicts way-2 of the
cache set.
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5.1.1.5 Incorrect instruction address bound
Our implemented incorrectly treated address 32’h3FFFF_FFFF as a data access. The
specification dictates that this is a instruction address. This was caused by the use of a
wrong relation operator.
5.1.1.6 MESI state update during invalidate_snoop
Consider a situation in which two level-1 caches (0 and 1) have a data block A in shared
state. When CPU1 performs a write operation to block A, L1-cache1 would send out an
invalidate request on the system bus. The incoming invalidation message is processed by
L1-cache0, but the MESI state of block A is not changed to invalid. Internally, the MESI
state was updated by the wrong variable. This is corrected by fixing the internal variable.
5.1.1.7 LRU eviction does not invalidate cache line
In the case that a cache set is full, an incoming CPU operation to the same set, which
results in a miss, would force eviction of a cache line. If the evicted cache line is in
modified state, dirty data is written to level-2 cache, but the cache line is not invalidated.
As a result, the CPU operation is not successful. Behavior was similar for eviction of a
shared block. Once again, the cause of this bug was a faulty internal variable.
5.1.1.8 Bus request dropped after LRU eviction
The specification states that LRU replacement and the bus request should be performed
as a single operation on the system bus. Our legacy design drops the request for primary
bus access soon after the eviction is completed. A new request for the common bus is
initiated later to receive the CPU requested data block. This is a clear deviation from the
specification, which is rectified with minor corrections to the RTL.
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5.1.1.9 Response to snoop-side invalidate request
Consider a block A to be present in shared state in 3 level-1 caches (0,1 and 2). A write
request from CPU2 would generate an invalidate on the system bus from L1-cache2. Our
legacy design is tuned in such a way that both L1-cache0 and L1-cache1 respond by assert-
ing their own invalidation_done signals for exactly one clock cycle. In most scenarios, L1-
cache0 and L1-cache1 respond at the same clock (immediately), therefore error is masked.
If either of the caches took longer to respond, then all_invalidation_done signal is never
generated. A late response is possible during corner cases such as a parallel conflicting
CPU request. Fortunately, we identified this error in one of the pseudo-random test-cases.
We fixed the issue by forcing the uni-core module to assert the invalidation_done signal
until all_invalidation_done is observed as logic high.
5.1.1.10 Discrepancy with reference model due to silent eviction
This discrepancy between the cache reference model and the implementation is due
to the non-atomic nature of state transitions. Cache reference model assumes that each
CPU operation is atomic, and concurrent CPU operations are executed in a fixed order as
received on the CPU monitors. Arbiter in the design should essentially ensures that any
conflicting operations are serialized. We illustrate the issue with the help of an example as
shown in Figure 5.2.
Consider 5 data blocks (A1, A2, A3, A4, and A5) belonging to the same set A. L1-
cache0 has blocks A1, A2, A3, and A4 in shared, exclusive, modified and modified states
respectively. L1-cache1 receives a CPU read for block A2. It sends out a request for
primary access (proc) to the system bus. Once granted primary access to the common
bus by the arbiter, L1-cache1 sends out a bus read request for block A2. Simultaneously,
CPU0 transmits a read request for block A5, which triggers silent eviction of block A2
due to the LRU replacement policy.
60
Figure 5.2: Silent eviction issue
Our reference model dictates that the bus read to A2 is serviced by L1-cache0. It
assumes that as CPU read to A5 is not completed, eviction of A2 should not be done
yet. However, our design does not wait for bus grant before silently evicting a block in
shared or exclusive state. Therefore, bus read os A2 is serviced by level-2 cache. This
discrepancy is fixed by simply waiting for primary grant (proc grant) of the system bus
before performing silent eviction. This error cropped up only in tests with significantly
random stimulus. Debug effort required was high due to the waveforms with considerably
large simulation time.
5.1.1.11 Incorrect update of LRU state variable
The LRU state variable should be updated whenever a CPU operation is performed on
the cache set. Consider two sets A and B; block A1 resides in way-1 of set A and block
B2 is present in way-2 of set B. The CPU performs a read to B2, quickly followed by a
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read to block A1. The LRU logic in our implementation updates its state whenever there
is a change in either block_accessed or index_proc, both of which are internally gener-
ated signals. Signal block_accessed is the output of a register while index_proc is mere
combinational logic. As a result, there is a single cycle delay between block_accessed and
index_proc. This delay causes the LRU state of set A to be updated as if way-2 was being
accessed before way-1 is looked-up. The expected behavior is that LRU state is updated
only considering access to way-1. This leads to incorrect LRU state.
This behavior manifested as the unnecessary eviction of a cache block several thousand
cycles after the actual bug. It was challenging to identify the source of faulty behavior.
Several design changes across the complete hierarchy were necessary to arrive at a working
fix. The IO ports of numerous internal modules were changed. Therefore, we consider this
bug a serious flaw, leading to a major design change. Finally, our fix ensured that LRU
state was updated only when a new internal signal lru_update was asserted. ’lru_update’
went high for exactly one cycle when the block being accessed is hit within the cache.
5.1.1.12 LRU state variable for shared to modified transition
This error is the result of the fix suggested in Section 5.1.1.11. Several test-cases
after the fix was made, we realized that the resolution was incomplete for a very specific
scenario. This corner case bug was extremely challenging to narrow down with each failed
waveform running for at least a few hundred thousand clock cycles. Although the LRU
state is updated incorrectly at a relatively early stage, it takes a lot of time before the bug
manifests itself as a failure.
We realized that for a CPU write operation, which triggers a shared to modified transi-
tion, internal signal lru_update is incorrectly generated multiple times. We fixed this error
by aligning lru_update to the actual CPU response.
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5.1.1.13 Contention between CPU and snoop-side requests
The biggest challenge we faced in simulation was the contention issue between CPU
and snoop-side requests. Several failures within the regression suite were associated to this
issue. We noticed that whenever conflicting requests to the same block were made on the
CPU and snoop-side concurrently, several failures would be observed. Essentially the uni-
core module attempts to service both the CPU side request and the snoop-side operation
in parallel, which leads to unpredictable behavior. A simple example is a CPU write to
block A, which is present as modified in the cache, and a parallel bus_rdx message on the
system bus. As the cache attempts to service both requests, coherence and consistency are
effortlessly lost.
Although we narrowed down the source of failure, we failed to identify a complete
solution using the simulation framework. We attempted several fixes, but we could merely
increase the pass rate in regressions. We never managed to eliminate the issue completely.
Different fixes resulted in special corner-case errors, which took several days to analyze.
Each failing trace was at least five hundred thousand nanoseconds of simulation time with
numerous concurrent transactions. We gave up due to the sheer time and effort required
for analysis. Finally, we were able to resolve the issue with much ease in formal property
verification. We discuss this issue and its fix at greater length in Section 5.2.2.3.
5.1.2 Coverage
Coverage metrics obtained using the final regression run, with all cases passing, are
presented in Tables 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7.
We went through a few iterations to refine functional coverage by excluding unreach-
able cover points, after which we attained complete functional coverage. However, code
coverage values presented are unadulterated, without any waivers or exclusions. Refined
metrics obtained after manual analysis is presented in Section 5.4.3. Verification engineers
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Table 5.5: Code coverage metrics without any exclusions
Instance Block Expression Toggle
Multi-core L1 cache 96.47% 93.69% 93.76%
Uni-core L1-cache(i) 96.47% 93.69% 89.49%
L1-cache(i) data cache 96.96% 99.11% 93.77%
L1-cache(i) inst cache 95.99% 69.44% 84.29%
L2 cache 83.08% 100% 65.03%
Arbiter 95.24% - 100%
Memory 71.43% - 53.25%
Table 5.6: Assertion coverage metrics
Type Coverage
CPU0-lv1 interface 100%
CPU1-lv1 interface 100%
CPU2-lv1 interface 100%
CPU3-lv1 interface 100%
System bus interface 100%
FPV assumptions 100%
Table 5.7: Functional coverage after analysis
Type Coverage
CPU0 monitor 100%
CPU1 monitor 100%
CPU2 monitor 100%
CPU3 monitor 100%
System bus monitor 100%
MESI coverage 100%
LRU coverage 100%
in the industry often spend weeks in analyzing uncovered portions of coverage. We plan
to execute this time consuming analysis of code coverage in collusion with a formal tool
called JasperGold Unreachable Coverage (JG UNR), which promises to simplify the ef-
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fort. Our goal is to evaluate the applicability of JG UNR to our UVM framework. This
effort and its results are provided in Section 5.4.3.
Our functional coverage is in line with our pre-set goal of cent percent coverage. After
manually justified exclusions, code coverage for the DUV attained acceptable values. Our
regression suite consists of 22 test-cases each run for 100 random seeds. No failures were
observed over the last several executions of the suite. Based on our coverage values, pass
rate, bug rate, and bugs discovered, we conclude that we have successfully completed
verification of our MESI-cache implementation using a state-of-the-art UVM test-bench.
5.2 Formal Methods
Our foremost focus during initial stages of FPV was to ensure that cover points are
reached and typical behavior is observed. We went through several iterations to refine
the assumptions and covers. We manually verified waveforms for typical behaviors and
confirmed that the design is not trivially over-constrained. We repeated this analysis at
every complexity stage, whenever a change to constraints was committed. A sample cover
trace of a CPU write miss operation as seen on JasperGold is illustrated as Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.3: CPU write miss operation as a JG cover statement
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We successfully defined assertions for all features, except the replacement algorithm,
as described in the specification. A complete list of proof targets is provided in Appendix
B.3. We examined properties relevant to the CPU-lv1, system bus interface, bounded live-
ness, MESI state transitions, coherence, memory consistency, and bug fixes. We obtained
full proof for the interfaces, MESI transitions and bug fixes with reduced design param-
eters. We captured the definitions of cache coherence and memory consistency, namely
the single-write, multiple-read invariant, and the data-value invariant, as end-to-end asser-
tions. These invariants were explained earlier in Chapter 1. Although, we only managed a
bounded proof on coherence assertions. The bound is sufficiently high for us to exude con-
fidence about the design. We can safely say that several corner-case bugs were eliminated,
and that the design is coherent and consistent.
Table 5.8: Property summary for uni-core FPV
Type Total Proven\Reached CEX\Unreachable Undetermined
Complexity Stage-1 (CS1)
Assumes 42 N/A N/A N/A
Cover Statements 130 130 0 0
Assertions 55 53 0 2
Complexity Stage-2 (CS2)
Assumes 43 N/A N/A N/A
Cover Statements 130 130 0 0
Assertions 56 54 0 2
Complexity Stage-3 (CS3)
Assumes 43 N/A N/A N/A
Cover Statements 130 130 0 0
Assertions 56 52 0 4
As stated earlier, FPV was carried out at two levels, namely uni-core and multi-core
modules, with stages of increasing complexity in each level. Summary of FPV proper-
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Table 5.9: Assertion status for uni-core FPV
Type CS1 CS2 CS3
CPU-lv1 interface Proven Proven Proven
System bus interface Proven Proven Proven
Liveness Proven Proven Proven
MESI protocol Proven Proven Proven
Bug fixes Proven Proven Proven
Coherence and consistency Bounded Bounded Bounded
Table 5.10: Bounded proofs in uni-core FPV
Assertion Bound (CS1) CS2 CS3
Liveness (CPU read) Infinity Infinity Infinity
Liveness (CPU write) Infinity Infinity Infinity
Coherence (CPU read) Infinity 35 30
Coherence (LRU eviction) 45 44 41
Coherence (Snoop write-back) Infinity 33 30
Coherence (Snoop share) 35 32 30
ties for the uni-core verification level is presented as Table 5.8. The number of assertions
and assumptions change slightly between complexity stages as certain assumptions are
eliminated and some assertions are clubbed together. Results of the uni-core property ver-
ification is described in Table 5.9. We observe that interface, MESI and bug fix assertions
are fully proven in all complexity stages. Liveness is proven in stages CS1 and CS2, with
guarantee that every CPU operation is completed within 11 cycles. This proof is possi-
ble due to simplifying assumptions (in CS1 and CS2) that access and data on the system
bus is provided within a few clock cycles. In stage-3, we place realistic assumptions that
the system bus access is granted in a maximum of 45 clock cycles, and that data is pro-
vided on the bus in a maximum of 9 clock cycles. These assumptions are determined by
observing behavior in the multi-core FPV environment. In the worst case, when all other
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level-1 caches perform eviction and write-back (each core takes 15 cycles), we obtain proc
grant of shared bus in 45 cycles. Due to changes in the assumptions, liveness assertions
are proven in CS3 to guarantee that CPU operations are completed in 61 clock cycles.
Complete proof gives us full confidence that the uni-core model demonstrates liveness
properties if access and data is provided on the system bus in a timely manner.
Bounds for the inconclusive properties in different complexity stages are listed in Table
5.10. Limits to the proof were obtained after running FPV for about 24 hours of machine
time. Two of the coherence assertions are fully proven for CS1. Due to limited computing
resources and time, we only manage a bounded proof for coherence properties in CS2 and
CS3. We predict that a full proof can be generated with additional computing resources
and time. Nevertheless, bounded proofs significantly increase confidence about the design.
Cover statements in our FPV describe typical behavior in traces with a length of about 10
clock cycles. Clearly, we notice that the bound on memory consistency is of the order of
4-5 transactions. Therefore, we conclude that our analysis is sound.
Assumptions to the uni-core module, were evaluated as assertions in the multi-core in-
stantiation environment. A summary of the properties and their results for the multi-core
module are presented as Tables 5.11 and 5.12 respectively. We successfully validated as-
sumptions to the cache module in the instantiation environment. A few of the assumptions
(8/40) from uni-core stage-3, which included long sequences, only obtained a bounded
proof. An example is the assumption that L1-cache obtains proc grant within 45 clock
cycles after asserting system bus request. A counter-example was not found even after
over 36 hours of formal analysis. Additionally, all the assumptions were verified using
exhaustive simulation in the UVM regression suite. Therefore, we can state with reason-
able confidence that the assumptions of uni-core FPV are valid. We also proved most
uni-core assertions in the multi-core model. We obtained bounded proofs for liveness, and
coherence assertions alone. A summary of bounded proofs is provided as Table 5.13. This
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provides immense confidence about our proof environment.
Table 5.11: Property summary for multi-core FPV
Type Total Proven\Reached CEX\Unreachable Undetermined
Assumes 52 N/A N/A N/A
Cover Statements 216 216 0 0
Assertions 113 95 0 18
Table 5.12: Assertion status for multi-core FPV
Type Result
Arbiter behavior Proven
Coherence (Multi-core) Bounded proof
Uni-core assumptions Proven (32/40)
Uni-core assertions
CPU-lv1 interface Proven
System bus interface Proven
Liveness Bounded proof
MESI protocol Proven
Bug fixes Proven
Coherence (Unicore) Bounded proof
Progress of an FPV effort is generally observed by tracking property status, asser-
tion density, and trends in bug discovery [1]. An approximate illustration of our project
progress over time is captured in Figures 5.4. Progress in FPV, as is typical, is observed
in lumps towards the end of a complexity stage. A single bug fix can suddenly improve
proof completion status by a large margin.
The pseudo-LRU replacement algorithm, which is excluded from FPV, is challenging
to describe as properties due to the large state involved. Additionally, replacement is not
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Table 5.13: Bounded proofs in multi-core FPV
Assertion Bound
Liveness (CPU read) 65
Liveness (CPU write) 65
Coherence (CPU read) 28
Coherence (LRU eviction) 49
Coherence (Snoop write-back) 28
Coherence (Snoop share) 24
Multi-core Coherence (CPU read) 23
Figure 5.4: FPV progress over time
as critical as coherence, consistency and liveness. It is acceptable to lose performance due
to a minor LRU bug, but the system would not function without coherence. Therefore, we
prescribe LRU property verification as future work. The biggest take-away from FPV is
high confidence about coherence, memory consistency and IO protocol of our cache im-
plementation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first effort at full-proof verification
of a MESI-cache design at the RTL level, completed by leveraging parameterization.
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5.2.1 Justification for Reduced Design Parameters
A prime factor, that enabled FPV of our cache at the RTL level, is design parameteriza-
tion. Property verification is impossible with the original design size due to the large state
space of a 256KB data cache. We proved properties by minimizing the design size. We
carefully chose a set of minimal parameters that do not restrict any obvious, interesting
behavior. A 7-bit address with 2-bit offset ensures that the address segregation module
is utilized completely. A 2-bit set index ensures that we have 4 sets in each of the L1
caches. Each set has 4 ways and the entire data cache has 16 lines each 4 bits wide. A
3-bit address tag guaranteed that there were unique tags to trigger replacements within the
set. An instruction address bound of 7’h1F ensured that interaction between instructions
and data space was possible. Four instances, which is the intention of the original design,
were used in the multi-core proof environment.
We understand that there is inherent risk in reducing design parameters. We could re-
strict interesting behavior that is possible only with the original configuration. In order to
tackle this risk, we cleverly selected a reduced configuration that does not limit any obvi-
ous scenarios. Despite a careful selection of the minimal configuration, we acknowledge
that parameterization can limit certain behavior in an unforeseen manner. Our intended
plan was to extend our proof to the original configuration by using theorem proving tech-
niques and induction. However, due to limited resources and time, we were not able to
execute proof within a theorem proving system. Although we cannot say with certainty
that the design is flawless, we have significantly high confidence about the implementation
as a result of proof in the reduced setting. We defer proof with a theorem prover as future
work.
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5.2.2 Bugs Discovered
We identified and resolved a total of 14 design flaws using formal analysis. The high-
light of our FPV effort was complete resolution of the CPU-snoop contention issue, which
could not be fixed in the simulation framework. Short counter-example traces, which point
to the exact source of failure, simplified analysis and verification of bug fixes.
5.2.2.1 Absence of reset signal
An obvious limitation of the legacy design, which is the lack of a global reset, was
apparent immediately in FPV. Since the legacy design was not created with intent for syn-
thesis, initial blocks were used to instantiate state elements within the design. Simulation
did not raise red flags as registers were initialized either by basic CPU operations or by
initial blocks. Simulation does not treat unknown or high impedance values as potential
causes of failure. FPV, on the other hand, inherently performs lint checks as it requires
the input model to be synthesizable. Therefore, we identified the crucial need for a global
reset immediately in FPV. Although this is almost a trivial bug, it highlights the impor-
tance of RTL quality checks early in the design cycle. We resolved this bug by updating
the specification to include a global reset input.
5.2.2.2 Presence of in-out ports
The legacy design made use of several in-out ports within the interface. Most signals
like address, data, data_valid, bus_rd, etc. were driven by multiple entities. Although
drivers of these in-out signals are mutually exclusive, these signals are often driven to
high-impedance values. This can potentially lead to wrong interpretation when the design
is realized in silicon. A high-impedance generally manifests as the previous active value
due to capacitance. Therefore, in real life, a high-Z could incorrectly be observed as a
logic high value. Once again, this relatively trivial issue brings forward the importance of
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lint checks which are inherent to FPV. We resolved this bug by updating the specification
to provide dedicated inputs and outputs.
5.2.2.3 Contention between CPU and snoop-side requests
The most critical bug identified is the contention issue between CPU and snoop-side
requests. This issue arises as the implementation attempts to service both CPU and snoop
operations at the same time. An abstract MESI model assumes that state transitions are
atomic, but in reality several transitions take multiple clock cycles. In case of conflicting
concurrent requests from the CPU and system bus, coherence is destroyed in our legacy
implementation.
Figure 5.5: Example of contention issue
A particular example of contention is depicted in Figure 5.5. Consider a level-1 uni-
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Figure 5.6: JasperGold counter-example for contention issue
core cache module with a data block A1 present in modified state. Assume that in the
first clock cycle, our module receives a bus read request for A1. In order to process the
bus read request, the cache module obtains snoop access to the system bus and issues a
level-2 write back for A1. While the write-back is still in progress, it receives a CPU write
operation for A1 in clock cycle 5. Our implementation is tuned to service both CPU and
snoop in parallel. Therefore, A1 data value is updated to 0x00 and write done signal is
issued to the CPU. Clearly, the concept of coherence is violated.
JasperGold generated a counter-example depicting the above scenario, early in the FPV
process. An assertion defined for the system-bus interface dictated that data is unchanged
as long as level-2 write signal is enabled. JasperGold provided a counter-example violating
this property, to highlight the contention issue. In Figure 5.5, we notice that level-2 write-
back data changes from 0x02 to 0x00 in clock cycle 6. A waveform of the trace generated
in JasperGold is illustrated as Figure 5.6.
FPV demonstrated that several situations can lead to similar violations. Any two con-
flicting requests to the same data block can destroy coherence and consistency. We realized
that in order to resolve this concurrency bug, we must prioritize either the CPU operation
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or the snoop request in case of a conflict. We attempted numerous solutions with varying
definitions of priority. Bugs described in Sections 5.2.2.4 and 5.2.2.5 are the results of
our experiments. Ease of debug and resolution in FPV is extraordinary when compared to
simulation. Often, we had no clue about the root cause of failures in simulation. It took
several days to analyze long, random regression results to identify corner-case issues. On
the other hand, FPV provided short traces which pointed to the exact cause of the failure.
It took only a few minutes to identify the flaw in our proposed solution to the concurrency
issue. Liveness properties combined with data stability assertions were most effective in
debug.
Table 5.14: Solution to concurrency issue: Priority when CPU request observed first
CPU Bus access required Snoop request Bus access granted Priority
Read
No (M,E,S) X N/A CPU
Yes(I)
X No Snoop
X Yes CPU
Write
No (M,E) X N/A CPU
Yes(S,I)
X No Snoop
X Yes CPU
Table 5.15: Solution to concurrency issue: Priority when snoop request observed first
Snoop CPU operation Priority
Bus read X Snoop
Bus read to modify X Snoop
Invalidate X Snoop
Finally, after substantial debug, we identified and proved a working fix within the FPV
environment. Our solution requires a significant change to the implementation. We define
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two internal signal CPUFirst and SnoopFirst as flags generated for priority. CPUFirst in-
dicates that in case of conflict, CPU operation should be prioritized whereas snoop request
is halted. SnoopFirst indicates that snoop response must be given higher priority while
CPU operation is stalled. As a corollary, both flags are mutually exclusive.
Our solution is succinctly captured in Tables 5.14 and 5.15. Note that ’X’ in the tables
indicates don’t care. Consider the situation in which CPU operation is observed before
a conflicting request on the system bus, Table 5.14 describes this scenario. If conflicting
requests are observed in the same clock or snoop message is noticed first, Table 5.15 de-
fines the solution. Essentially, snoop requests are prioritized if observed first, as captured
in Table 5.15. CPU operations must be prioritized if they do not require system bus access
or if our cache module has already received grant of the shared bus. SV code to realize the
above solution is given below:
1 a s s i g n p r o c _ r e q = c o r e _ i f . cpu_rd | c o r e _ i f . cpu_wr ;
2 a s s i g n p r o c _ r e s p = c o r e _ i f . d a t a _ i n _ b u s _ c p u _ l v 1 | c o r e _ i f . cpu_wr_done ;
3 a s s i g n snoop_req = s b u s _ i f . bus_ rdx_snoop | s b u s _ i f . bus_ rd_snoop | s b u s _ i f .
i n v a l i d a t e _ s n o o p ;
4 a s s i g n s n o o p _ r e s p = s b u s _ i f . b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ r e q _ s n o o p | s b u s _ i f . o u t _ d a t a _ i n _ b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 |
s b u s _ i f . i n v a l i d a t i o n _ d o n e ;
5 a s s i g n c o n f l i c t = ( p r o c _ r e q ) && ( snoop_req ) && ( ‘SBUS_IF_ADDR == ‘CORE_IF_ADDR ) ;
6
7 a s s i g n s n o o p _ f i r s t = snoop_req & ~ c p u _ f i r s t ;
8
9 always@ ( posedge c o r e _ i f . c l k or posedge r s t ) begin
10 i f ( r s t )
11 c p u _ f i r s t <= 1 ’ b0 ;
12 e l s e begin
13 i f ( p r o c _ r e s p )
14 c p u _ f i r s t <= 1 ’ b0 ;
15 e l s e i f ( s b u s _ i f . b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ g n t _ p r o c & ~ snoop_req )
16 c p u _ f i r s t <= 1 ’ b1 ;
17 end
18 end
Although in retrospect, our solution to the concurrency issue seems simple at the ab-
stract level, it required significant engineering effort to be realized in RTL code.
5.2.2.4 Deadlock situation
An incorrect solution to the concurrency issue described in the Section 5.2.2.3 can eas-
ily result in deadlocks. An obvious deadlock is reached when priority flags are generated
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merely on the basic of which request is observed first. Consider the case of a shared block
A1 in the L1-cache. Say it receives a CPU write in the first cycle, while awaiting grant to
the common bus, it receives a snoop invalidate request for block A1. Since our solution
chose to prioritize CPU operation and stall the snoop request, the system fails to make any
forward progress.
A complex deadlock situation is achieved when we attempted to solve the concurrency
issue by generating priority flags (CPUFirst and SnoopFirst) using blk_hit_proc, an in-
ternal signal. In this solution, CPU operation is given priority if signal blk_hit_proc is
generated before a conflicting snoop request is observed. Internal signal blk_hit_proc is
asserted when the block requested by the CPU results in a hit (obtained from bus or previ-
ously present in cache). This fix works for most scenarios except when both blk_hit_proc
and a conflicting snoop request arrive in the same clock cycle. If we chose to stall the
snoop request in this scenario, deadlock is achieved for specific CPU requests.
Figure 5.7: Example of deadlock
An example of this complex deadlock is illustrated in Figure 5.7. Consider a data
block A1, present in shared state. CPU issues a write operation on A1 in the first clock
cycle. System bus access is requested on the next clock, simultaneously an invalidate
request for A1 is received. Signal blk_hit_proc is asserted at the same time as the incoming
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invalidate. Therefore, based on our solution, we halt processing of the snoop request and
prioritize the CPU write which resulted in a cache hit. Snoop request cannot proceed
without invalidation. CPU write will not complete before system bus access. Hence,
deadlock is achieved.
This complex deadlock showed up only after several days of regression analysis in the
simulation framework. FPV, on the other hand, highlighted the issue almost immediately.
Interestingly a plausible deadlock situation was discovered in FPV even after simulation-
based verification was assumed to be complete. Within the implementation, we forgot to
raise bus request even if CPU operation was stalled due to a conflict. Although extremely
improbable, this could lead to an endless chain in which snoop requests are continuously
given higher priority. We identified this issue in FPV and fixed generation of the bus
request signal.
5.2.2.5 Livelock situation
A livelock is a scenario in which there is constant activity in the system, but it fails
to make any overall progress. Consider the solution based on internal signal blk_hit_proc
as described in Section 5.2.2.4. The only change is that if snoop and block hit rise on the
same clock edge, snoop transactions are given priority while CPU operations are stalled.
An example of how this solution leads to deadlock is illustrated as Figure 5.8.
Consider a write request to data block A1 in the first clock cycle. Our uni-core cache
obtains bus access and receives A1 in exclusive state. In the same cycle that block hit
is generated, a bus_rdx request to A1 is observed. Since our policy dictates that CPU
operation is halted in such a scenario, we invalidate A1 and service the snoop request. As
the CPU write is still incomplete, we re-issue the bus request. Our cache module obtains
bus grant, and immediately generates bus_rdx request for A1. In such a manner, bus grant
and A1 is constantly exchanged between two requesting L1-caches, resulting in a livelock.
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Figure 5.8: Example of livelock
Ultimately, we avoid deadlocks and livelocks by defining priority flags based on outputs
from the arbiter. Arbiter is the ultimate authority on resolution of conflicts in our system.
It is responsible for serializing operations, in effect defining the correct sequential order.
Our clean solution to the concurrency issue was described in Section 5.2.2.3.
5.2.2.6 Bus request without CPU operation
A cousin bug of the concurrency issue is that bus request is asserted even without an
active CPU operation. A counter-example from JasperGold is provided as Figure 5.9. A
conflicting snoop operation invalidates the cache block exactly in the same cycle in which
the CPU operation is serviced. As a result, there is a spurious bus request on the next
cycle. This bug is resolved with the fix for the concurrency issue.
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Figure 5.9: Counter-example highlighting bus request without CPU operation
5.2.2.7 Signal cp_in_cache for incoming invalidate request
As a result of the concurrency fix, whenever a snoop request was halted due to conflict
and CPU first priority, signal cp_in_cache was asserted irrespective of the snoop request.
However, the specification dictates that cp_in_cache should be generated for bus_rd or
bus_rdx requests only. We observed incorrect behavior as a counter-example to one of the
system bus assertions.
5.2.2.8 Invalidation acknowledgment during CPU first priority
Initially, acknowledgment for an invalidate request is asserted immediately if the block
is not present in cache. We assumed that this behavior would not be affected by the con-
currency fix. However, we later realized through FPV that invalidation done signal should
be halted if there is a conflict. This is another side effect bug of the incomplete concur-
rency fix. In this case, priority flags are generated correctly, but they are not fully utilized
to prevent incorrect behavior.
5.2.2.9 De-assertion of CPU first priority
The concurrency fix suggested in Section 5.2.2.3, dictates that priority flag CPUFirst
is de-asserted when a response is provided to the CPU. Our implementation was made in
the data cache functionality. We incorrectly ignored a response from instruction cache.
Consider the following situation: an instruction read obtains bus grant, which asserts the
80
CPUFirst signal, but completion of the read request does not de-assert CPUFirst. As a
result, the next data operation is incorrectly given higher priority than an incoming snoop
request, which leads to severe failures. This error is fixed by taking into consideration
response from the instruction cache as well.
5.2.2.10 Incorrect next-state logic in MESI FSM
Combinational logic to determine next-state function, within the MESI finite state ma-
chine, was realized incorrectly in the legacy design. It made the assumption that a snoop-
side invalidate request is impossible for a cache block existing in modified/exclusive state.
Uni-core FPV pointed out the existence of this flaw. We resolved this issue by supporting
invalidate requests for modified and shared data blocks.
5.2.2.11 LRU state implemented as latches
The LRU state for each cache set was implemented as a latch. Latches can cause issues
in a design based on a clock. FPV, which also performs a lint check on the RTL, pointed
out the presence of latch inference, early in the verification process. We resolved this bug
by recoding the RTL.
5.2.2.12 De-assertion of signal data_in_bus_cpu_lv1
Level-1 cache response to a CPU read operation is through the signal data_in_bus_cpu_lv1.
In the legacy design, this output remains high for one additional clock cycle after CPU read
request is de-asserted. As a result, in case of consecutive read and write requests, output
data_in_bus_cpu_lv1 is high when a CPU write operation is in progress. This is undesir-
able and can lead to confusion in the core. We eliminate this possibility by a logical AND
operation with CPU read request.
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5.2.2.13 De-assertion of signal cpu_wr_done
Level-1 cache responds to a CPU write operation with cpu_wr_done to signal that the
write is successfully completed. Similar to the previous bug, cpu_wr_done remained high
during a CPU read operation. This is avoided by simply performing a logical AND with
the write request.
5.2.2.14 Multiple drivers for lv2_wr_done
Multi-core FPV identified the presence of multiple drivers for the lv2_wr_done signal.
In the implementation, this port is declared as an output of the multiplexer block within
the multi-core module. However, it is also driven by independent glue logic within the
module. This is another example of a lint error spotted by JasperGold.
5.2.3 Coverage
FPV tools including JapserGold provide coverage metrics to track the percentage of
logic covered as properties. Although these measures are not as robust as coverage in the
simulation framework, it provides a rough idea of verification progress. Coverage in FPV
is primarily based on the logic that falls within the cone of influence of defined assertions.
Occasionally, additional logic might be considered part of an assertion’s logic cone even
without a significantly direct impact. Therefore, these metrics should be treated as a rough
estimate rather than the sign-off criteria. We provide our line and signal coverage numbers
in Table 5.16. Since we haven’t defined assertions for LRU functionality, a slight dip in
coverage is expected.
Table 5.16: Coverage metrics for FPV
Type Line Coverage Signal Coverage
Uni-core module 97.08% 88.42%
Multi-core environment 96.65% 73.10%
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5.2.4 Formal as Design Aid
Formal techniques are handy tools in the hands of design engineers as well. We en-
countered numerous applications of formal analysis specific to RTL design during our
verification process. We outline these usage scenarios in this section. Table 5.17 provides
details of our minimized configuration, to help appreciate the design size and complex-
ity feasible for formal analysis. Our FPV exercise demonstrates that formal methods are
effective for complex, real-life designs with suitable parameterization.
Table 5.17: Design size for our FPV
Type PI PO State elements Property flop bits
Uni-core module 39 29 1117 748
Multi-core environment 68 46 2926 1228
Scenarios for the use of formal technology as design aid, exercised in our study, are
listed below:
1. Automatic lint check
FPV tools including JasperGold inherently perform a lint check of the RTL for syn-
thesis. With reference to our study, FPV highlighted quality issues like the absence
of reset, presence of in-out ports, and latch inference. Usually these issues are identi-
fied by a lint tool later during the synthesis stage. A quality lint check in the form of
FPV, at an early design stage is helpful. JasperGold provides a specific application
called Automatic Formal Lint (AFL), which specializes in RTL quality checks.
2. Legacy design understanding
Design implementations are usually passed through teams and engineers across sev-
eral years. Ownership is often transferred to new designers, who have no clue about
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the previous design. Sufficient documentation to understand the implementation is
often absent. This is similar to how we obtained a legacy implementation of the
cache controller. Formal property verification is extremely useful in such scenarios.
Cover statements and simple properties serve as an instant test-bench. We are able
to generate interesting behavior with minimal effort. A prime advantage in FPV is
that we are required to merely specify the destination, the tool figures out the short-
est path to achieve that state. This is in stark contrast from simulation, where every
step of the journey must be explicitly defined. With reference to our project, say we
wish to observe behavior when a write operation is performed on a shared block, we
simply specify a cover statement.
3. Design exercise FPV
Designers can use FPV to bring up an instant test-bench with minimal effort. Typical
behavior can be analyzed without spending significant time on the development of
UVM components. It is acceptable to over-constrain the design in such an exercise,
as robust verification will be performed later. With simplified assumptions, early
design flaws can be weeded out before release to the verification team.
4. Validation of bug fixes
Major design updates, like the concurrency fix in our project, often lead to numerous
additional bugs as a side effect. If we can define the micro-architectural update as
properties, a clean implementation can be obtained with few iterations in FPV. We
come to this conclusion based on our experience with the concurrency fix. Addi-
tional holes within the implementation were identified immediately with assertions
that represented the update at an abstract level.
5. Formal equivalence verification for RTL
FEV is a powerful technique to guarantee that functionality is preserved with design
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changes like parameterization, de-feature bits, clock gating, and timing fixes. FEV
is often faster than performing a complete FPV execution on the new design. When
such changes are made late in the design process, FEV can quickly provide confi-
dence that functionality is preserved. We utilized FEV to verify parameterization
of the number of cores. We performed combinational equivalence between the old
implementation and the parameterized model with default configuration.
6. Performance verification
Property verification can guarantee performance bounds for a given design if com-
plexity is manageable. In our study, we fixed the latency for liveness properties.
Under specific assumptions on level-2 performance, we could ensure that a CPU
operation is serviced within a fixed number of clock cycles. We first start with the
least latency value, and analyze the counter-example to evaluate if behavior is valid.
In complexity stage-2 of our uni-core FPV, we proved that both CPU read and write
is serviced within 11 clock cycles, based on the assumption that shared bus access is
granted immediately. If the scenario is acceptable, we increase the latency bound in
the property. Otherwise, we fix the RTL to ensure performance requirement is met.
5.3 Comparison between Formal and Simulation
In this section, we offer an elaborate comparison between our FPV and simulation
efforts. We comment about the ease of debug, bug discovery, trace length, required exper-
tise and corner case errors in each approach. It is fairly clear that both technologies have
their own advantages and limitations. Neither formal not simulation can fully replace the
alternative approach, at least with the current tool capabilities.
Table 5.18 briefly summarizes a general analysis of simulation and formal techniques.
The 3 pillars which form the focus of simulation-based verification are stimulus, checkers
and coverage. Formal analysis is centered around defining properties and controlling state
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Table 5.18: Generic analysis of formal vs simulation
Simulation framework Formal verification
Focus Random stimulus
Functional coverage
Checkers
Properties
State space exploration
Challenges Corner cases
Time to build infrastructure
Debug
Data transformation blocks
Property definition
Complexity (state space)
Typical trace length Large Short
Ease of debug Medium Easy
Expertise required Low Medium
Time to first bug 2-3 weeks 1-2 days
Complex bugs Hit after several regres-
sions
Easy analysis of concurrency,
deadlock , and livelock
space. Therefore, both techniques require a fundamentally different perspective. Simula-
tion excels in large designs like system-on-a-chip(SoC) implementation. SoC level ver-
ification is impossible using formal techniques due to the immense state space problem.
Nevertheless, simulation is deficient in the analysis of corner cases, it fails to exhaustively
verify the design. Formal techniques are suited to rigorously verify control blocks and
data transport modules, by highlighting subtle corner case issues [40]. It is challenging to
formally verify data transformation blocks which operate on huge chunks of data, due to
complexity. Formal analysis is challenging to apply in verification of packet-based pro-
tocols. But with techniques like parameterized hardware design, we believe that formal
verification of large packet based protocols can be made feasible.
Within the simulation framework, verification cannot begin until the necessary infras-
tructure is substantially developed [24]. This includes checkers, drivers, monitors and
coverage collectors. As a result, it takes several weeks even for a basic investigation of
the design. Simulation traces are generally long, making debug challenging as compared
to formal. It is common for an error to show up several thousand cycles after the primary
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source of bug. Engineers manually trace back several transactions to identify plausible
causes of failure. Additionally, complex issues like concurrency, deadlocks and livelocks
are hard to reason about in simulation [41]. Identification of complex issues relies on re-
gressions with pseudo-random stimulus. Despite the drawbacks, simulation is the de-facto
standard in the industry due to the limited expertise requirement.
Formal methods, on the other hand, are capable of creating instant test-benches. We
can perform verification of typical behavior as soon as the design is available. There-
fore, formal techniques can identify erroneous behavior almost immediately. It is easy to
understand and debug complex issues like concurrency and deadlock. This is evident in
our study, contention between the CPU and snoop was identified in simulation, but de-
bug and resolution was impossible due to long random traces. Analysis of concurrency
was extremely simple within FPV as it provided short traces pin-pointing the exact cause
of failure. Therefore, debug is significantly simpler in formal. Nevertheless, engineers
require additional training and expertise before successful application of formal methods.
Seligman et al. assert that formal verification provides a greater return on investment
(ROI) as compared to simulation in terms of engineering and machine costs [1]. An in-
crease in ROI of about 2-9x was observed for formal analysis of real designs at Intel. We
compare results from the UVM framework and FPV in Table 5.19. Approximately ten
weeks of focused engineering effort was spent on simulation, while about 8 weeks were
dedicated to FPV. Our study is inherently disadvantageous to FPV as the formal effort
succeeded the simulation exercise. Formal verification provides maximum benefits when
introduced early in the design process [1]. Although earlier FV was suitable only with
mature RTL due to the long analysis time, FV tools in their recent capacity provide max-
imum benefits early in the design process. In spite of the clear disadvantage, we observe
that FPV provides better ROI in all aspects of comparison. The number of bugs discov-
ered in either approach is comparable. However, the quality of bugs identified in FPV is
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Table 5.19: Comparison of results from formal vs simulation
UVM FPV FV advantage
Engineering effort 10 weeks 8 weeks -
Bugs discovered 13 14 1.07x
Bugs (%) 48% 52% -
Bugs/Eng effort 1.3 1.75 1.35x
Simple bugs 8 7 -
Complex bugs 5 4 -
FV quality bugs 0 3 -
Scaled bugs 8*1 + 5*2 = 18 7*1 + 4*2 + 3*4 = 27 1.5x
Scaled bugs/Eng effort 1.8 3.375 1.875x
Time to deploy 21 days 2 days 10.5x
Typical trace length 40000 cycles 6-40 cycles 100x
Typical execution time 3 hours 1 hour 3x
Time to concurrency issue 6 weeks 2 weeks 3x
Debug of complex bugs 1-3 days 1-2 hours 24x
significantly higher. If we assign weights based on complexity, FPV ROI is about 1.875x
that of simulation in terms of engineering effort. The significance of FPV is supported by
the fact that resolution of the concurrency issue was infeasible in simulation. The biggest
advantages of FPV are ease of debug and short counter-examples. They enabled imple-
mentation of an easy, clean fix for the contention bug. Debug time is reduced by about 20x
while trace length is shortened by a factor of hundred.
Despite its obvious advantages, formal analysis is limited by design complexity and
quality of properties. A feature of the DUV, which is not captured as a property cannot
be verified in FV. Often, it is challenging to describe certain features as properties without
adding significant state space. In our study, we excluded verification of LRU functionality
in FPV due to the number of state elements required. FPV can only verify behavior that
is explicitly specified. Contrastingly, pseudo-random simulation can fortuitously identify
faulty behavior which is not explicitly specified as well.
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5.4 Collaboration between Formal and Simulation
It is fairly obvious that neither formal nor simulation can completely replace the al-
ternative approach. Both techniques have their own unique advantages and deficiencies.
During the course of our study, we identified opportunities for successful collaboration be-
tween formal and simulation. We believe that both approaches can co-exist to supplement
each other, in a productive manner without compromising engineering effort. There are
several opportunities for a mutually beneficial arrangement. In this section, we describe
specific events in our study where we leveraged formal techniques within simulation and
vice-versa. We implore the use of formal methods as an integral part of the design process.
It essentially serves as a new form of interacting with the RTL.
5.4.1 Validating FPV Assumptions in Simulation
Assumptions form the basis of proof in a formal environment. It is crucial to verify the
set of constraints used to generate proof. This is achieved in three methods, namely argu-
ments supported by evidence in the specification, proving assumptions in the instantiation
environment, and extensive simulation. In our study, we attempted to prove assumptions
in the multi-core environment in addition to validating them in simulation. We observed
that it is relatively easier to verify assumptions in a extensive regression suite. All assump-
tions used in uni-core FPV passed as assertions in our UVM regression suite. Proof in the
instantiation environment is not always feasible due to complexity of the environment. In
such a situation, simulation-based verification at a higher level of hierarchy can be used to
gain confidence about assumptions used in FPV at the module level.
5.4.2 Bug-hunting FPV
In case of a risky design feature, bug hunting FPV can be performed on the critical
function in addition to simulation-based verification on the entire module. Bug hunting
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exercise is simpler compared to full-proof verification. Complexity is easier to handle
as properties are focused only on a portion of the logic. Additionally, we could black-
box irrelevant parts of the design. In our study, a bug hunting exercise centered around
coherence would yield good results when performed in addition to the UVM framework.
Our full-proof verification effort, which subsumes a bug hunting exercise, discovered 12
bugs not previously identified in the UVM environment.
5.4.3 Improving Simulation Code Coverage
Hundred percent code coverage is a significant sign-off criteria for the design. En-
gineers spend weeks analyzing uncovered portions of the RTL code. Formal analysis
can significantly speed up this process by determining unreachable portions of RTL [1].
JapserGold provides a application called UNR for this purpose. Our raw code coverage
metrics from simulation were presented earlier in Table 5.5. UNR provides a list of un-
reachable points, which we can categorize as either waive or fix. Greater confidence is
achieved when items are excluded after formal analysis has determined un-reachability.
We witnessed an improvement of about 0.5% to 2% without any significant effort on JG
UNR. These unreachable points were determined without any initialization or environ-
mental constraints. With sufficient input constraints, we believe that significant coverage
holes can be identified easily using JG UNR.
5.4.4 Additional Opportunities
A non-exhaustive list of additional possibilities is given below:
• Connectivity verification at SoC level [33]
• Control register verification
• Post-silicon debug [34]
• Security verification using information flow tracking [42]
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6. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, we successfully utilized formal property verification to gain immense
confidence about our MESI-based cache implementation in SystemVerilog. We demon-
strate that formal verification of cache controllers is feasible at the RTL level with suitable
parameterization. We performed full-proof verification of features, except LRU operation,
for our design in a reduced configuration. Although the minimized configuration does not
explicitly restrict any interesting behavior, we defer a formal proof of the original size de-
sign using theorem proving techniques as future work. We successfully defined interface-
level assertions for high level properties like coherence and memory consistency. Two
invariants, which constitute coherence in a shared memory system, namely the SWMR
and DV invariants are described as end-to-end assertions in SystemVerilog. Additionally,
we verified functionality of the communication infrastructure and protocol adherence of
the input-output interface using SystemVerilog assertions.
We provide an elaborate comparison between a state-of-the-art UVM environment and
FPV. We utilized de-facto industry approaches like pseudo-random stimulus, metric-driven
verification, and IP methodology, to develop a rigorous, parameterized, simulation frame-
work. We identified a total of 13 bugs using the UVM test-bench. However, it was ex-
tremely challenging to reason about complex issues like concurrency, deadlock and live-
lock. Large failure traces, with a run-time of several thousand cycles, rendered debug of
complex issues inefficient and infeasible. Corner case errors were identified predominantly
using random regressions, which required time-consuming analysis in order to identify the
source of failure.
Formal property verification identified a total of 14 design flaws, out of which 3 are
FV quality bugs that would be improbable to identify in random regressions. Despite the
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fact that FPV succeeded the UVM effort, FPV recognized a comparable number of design
flaws, unresolved in the simulation environment. The three FV quality bugs are described
in Sections 5.2.2.4, 5.2.2.5, and 5.2.2.8. We identified and resolved a critical concurrency
issue with the potential to destroy notions of coherence and consistency in our system.
This complex issue was the result of simultaneous, conflicting CPU and snoop-side re-
quests. Issues of deadlock and live-lock, which arose as a result of attempted fixes to the
concurrency bug, were resolved in FPV with minimal effort. In line with previous obser-
vations made by Seligman et al. [1], we note that FV offers a higher return on investment
in terms of engineering effort. A quick comparison of results, yields an FPV advantage
of 1.875x. FPV using parameterization enabled quick convergence of our design imple-
mentation. We conclude that it is substantially simpler to understand and resolve complex
issues like concurrency in a formal environment.
Formal and simulation are often incorrectly viewed as disparate, independent technolo-
gies. We note that there are numerous opportunities for successful collaboration between
the two approaches. Formal methods can complement simulation with specialized applica-
tion in connectivity, bug-hunting, register verification, linting, coverage improvement and
security among numerous possibilities. In our study, we demonstrated the use of formal as
coverage improvement and bug-hunting tools. Alternatively, the assumptions in a formal
environment can be verified using extensive simulation at a higher level of design hierar-
chy. Training designers and regular verification engineers in ABV is immensely beneficial
for the design process. FV is useful throughout the design process, popular use cases
include: design-exercise FPV, bug-hunting FPV, post-silicon debug, connectivity verifica-
tion, clock gating validation, RTL-netlist FEV, control register verification, and coverage
improvement. However, they are not limited to these specific usage models at particular
stages of the design cycle. Formal techniques serve as a generic tool-kit rather offering
new methods to interact with the RTL.
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We offer the following generic guidelines, based on our experience with formal verifi-
cation, to maximize productivity in digital design.
1. Apply FV early
FV methods provide significant advantages when applied early in the design cycle.
Lightweight usage models like design-exercise FPV can even apply to large and
complex designs by focusing on specific behavior. FV provides an instant test-bench
to observe typical behavior without significant effort.
2. Parameterize the implementation
Identify opportunities to parameterize the design at every stage. Parameterization
can reduce serious complexity making it feasible for FV.
3. Design as components tangible for FV
This is part of a greater envisioned plan for formally verified libraries. If modules
are designed in sizes that permit FV, components can be rigorously verified using
FV methods while simulation could serve the verification need at a higher level.
4. Specific application of FV
In cases where full scale application is infeasible, we suggest identifying specific
opportunities where Fv can provide better returns. Particular examples are con-
nectivity, control register, security verification, post-silicon debug and coverage im-
provement.
5. Bug-hunting FPV
In case of a critical feature, bug-hunting FPV can be performed to improve confi-
dence about the design.
6. FEV for design changes
FEV is useful in verifying design updates like parameterization, clock gating, and
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timing fixes. FEV effort in such cases is more robust when compared to simulation
regressions. It is often easier than a full-fledged FPV exercise as well.
6.1 Future Work
We enumerate opportunities to extend current work below:
1. Formal proof of coherence in original design configuration
In this study, we gained confidence of coherence and a sound communication in-
frastructure for a minimized configuration of the design. It would be interesting to
extend our proof to the general setting with theorem proving techniques.
2. Transactional equivalence between reference model and RTL
In our UVM environment, we developed a transaction-accurate reference model of
our design. An equivalence check between the transaction-level model and RTL
would evaluate the applicability of FEV tools for such a use case.
3. Formal verification of complex caches
Our study demonstrated the feasibility of FPV for a base-line MESI implementation
with a blocking, shared bus. Modern cache implementations are aggressively opti-
mized for performance with features like split-transactions, and write-buffers. The
communication infrastructure in a shared memory system is constantly evolving.
Bus architecture is replaced with NoC topologies like 2D mesh, or torus. Addition-
ally, recent concepts like hardware transactional memory further introduce complex-
ity to caches [43]. We suggest extension of our analysis to more complex designs.
4. Security verification of caches
Cache side-channel and timing attacks severely compromise hardware security. Cryp-
tographic algorithms like AES and RSA were violated by an unprivileged user pro-
gram based on timing information from cache misses [44]. We propose verification
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of security aware caches including partition-locked cache (PL cache) using formal
techniques. Specifically, SecVerilog enables security verification at the hardware
level by annotating SystemVerilog code with information flow tracking labels [42].
Analysis of formal approaches for security verification can further strengthen the
practical usage portfolio of FV.
95
REFERENCES
[1] E. Seligman, T. Schubert, and M. V. A. K. Kumar, Formal Verification: An Essen-
tial Toolkit for Modern VLSI Design. San Francisco, CA, USA: Morgan Kaufmann
Publishers Inc., 2015.
[2] D. J. Sorin, M. D. Hill, and D. A. Wood, A Primer on Memory Consistency and
Cache Coherence. Morgan & Claypool Publishers, 1st ed., 2011.
[3] M. M. K. Martin, “Formal verification and its impact on the snooping versus di-
rectory protocol debate,” in 2005 International Conference on Computer Design,
pp. 543–549, Oct 2005.
[4] D. Culler, J. P. Singh, and A. Gupta, Parallel Computer Architecture: A Hardware/-
Software Approach. San Francisco, CA, USA: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc.,
1998.
[5] N. Dave, M. C. Ng, and Arvind, “Automatic synthesis of cache-coherence protocol
processors using bluespec,” in Proceedings of the 2Nd ACM/IEEE International Con-
ference on Formal Methods and Models for Co-Design, MEMOCODE ’05, (Wash-
ington, DC, USA), pp. 25–34, IEEE Computer Society, 2005.
[6] D. Vantrease, M. H. Lipasti, and N. Binkert, “Atomic coherence: Leveraging
nanophotonics to build race-free cache coherence protocols,” in 2011 IEEE 17th In-
ternational Symposium on High Performance Computer Architecture, pp. 132–143,
Feb 2011.
[7] V. Nagarajan, “Lecture 5: Snooping coherence protocol,” 2017.
[8] Intel, Intel Core2 Extreme Processor X6800 and Intel Core2 Duo Desktop Processor
E6000 and E4000 Sequence.
96
[9] F. Verbeek, P. M. Yaghini, A. Eghbal, and N. Bagherzadeh, “Deadlock verification
of cache coherence protocols and communication fabrics,” IEEE Transactions on
Computers, vol. 66, pp. 272–284, Feb 2017.
[10] E. M. Clarke, O. Grumberg, H. Hiraishi, S. Jha, D. E. Long, K. L. McMillan, and
L. A. Ness, “Verification of the futurebus+ cache coherence protocol,” Formal Meth-
ods in System Design, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 217–232, 1995.
[11] F. Pong, M. Browne, A. Nowatzyk, and M. Dubois, “Design verification of the s3.mp
cache-coherent shared-memory system,” IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol. 47,
pp. 135–140, Jan 1998.
[12] F. Pong and M. Dubois, “Verification techniques for cache coherence protocols,”
ACM Comput. Surv., vol. 29, pp. 82–126, Mar. 1997.
[13] G. Delzanno, Automatic Verification of Parameterized Cache Coherence Protocols,
pp. 53–68. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2000.
[14] C.-T. Chou, P. K. Mannava, and S. Park, A Simple Method for Parameterized Veri-
fication of Cache Coherence Protocols, pp. 382–398. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, 2004.
[15] J. Bingham, J. Erickson, G. Singh, and F. Andersen, “Industrial strength refinement
checking,” in 2009 Formal Methods in Computer-Aided Design, pp. 180–183, Nov
2009.
[16] E. A. Emerson and V. Kahlon, Exact and Efficient Verification of Parameterized
Cache Coherence Protocols, pp. 247–262. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Hei-
delberg, 2003.
[17] Y. Li, K. Duan, Y. Lv, J. Pang, and S. Cai, “A novel approach to parameterized veri-
fication of cache coherence protocols,” in 2016 IEEE 34th International Conference
97
on Computer Design (ICCD), pp. 560–567, Oct 2016.
[18] R. Komuravelli, “Verification and performance of the denovo cache coherence pro-
tocol,” 2010. Master’s thesis at the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign.
[19] B. Choi, R. Komuravelli, H. Sung, R. Smolinski, N. Honarmand, S. V. Adve, V. S.
Adve, N. P. Carter, and C.-T. Chou, “Denovo: Rethinking the memory hierarchy
for disciplined parallelism,” in Proceedings of the 2011 International Conference on
Parallel Architectures and Compilation Techniques, PACT ’11, (Washington, DC,
USA), pp. 155–166, IEEE Computer Society, 2011.
[20] J. F. Cantin, M. H. Lipasti, and J. E. Smith, Dynamic Verification of Cache Coherence
Protocols, pp. 25–42. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2004.
[21] A. DeOrio, A. Bauserman, and V. Bertacco, “Post-silicon verification for cache co-
herence,” in 2008 IEEE International Conference on Computer Design, pp. 348–355,
Oct 2008.
[22] A. DeOrio, I. Wagner, and V. Bertacco, “Dacota: Post-silicon validation of the mem-
ory subsystem in multi-core designs,” in 2009 IEEE 15th International Symposium
on High Performance Computer Architecture, pp. 405–416, Feb 2009.
[23] Cadence, “Modeling and verifying cache-coherent protocols, vip, and designs.”
White paper by Cadence.
[24] C. Spear, SystemVerilog for Verification, Second Edition: A Guide to Learning the
Testbench Language Features. Springer Publishing Company, Incorporated, 2nd ed.,
2008.
[25] R. Salemi, The UVM primer. Boston Light Press, 2013.
98
[26] H. Zhaohui, A. Pierres, H. Shiqing, C. Fang, P. Royannez, E. P. See, and Y. L. Hoon,
“Practical and efficient soc verification flow by reusing ip testcase and testbench,” in
2012 International SoC Design Conference (ISOCC), pp. 175–178, Nov 2012.
[27] S. Vijayaraghavan and M. Ramanathan, A practical guide for SystemVerilog asser-
tions. Springer Science & Business Media, 2005.
[28] M. Graphics, “Verification academy,” UVM Cookbook. Mentor Graphics, pp. 1–569,
2012.
[29] Cadence, “SystemVerilog advanced verification using UVM,” 2012.
[30] U. V. M. Accellera, “1.1 users guide,” 2011.
[31] E. Cerny, S. Dudani, J. Havlicek, and D. Korchemny, SVA: The Power of Assertions
in SystemVerilog. Springer Publishing Company, Incorporated, 2nd ed., 2014.
[32] R. K. Ranjan, C. Coelho, and S. Skalberg, “Beyond verification: Leveraging formal
for debugging,” in 2009 46th ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference, pp. 648–
651, July 2009.
[33] S. K. Roy, “Top level soc interconnectivity verification using formal techniques,”
in 2007 Eighth International Workshop on Microprocessor Test and Verification,
pp. 63–70, Dec 2007.
[34] S. Ray and W. A. Hunt, “Connecting pre-silicon and post-silicon verification,” in
2009 Formal Methods in Computer-Aided Design, pp. 160–163, Nov 2009.
[35] V. Kottapalli and F. Andersen, “Formal property verification of a MESI-based cache
implementation,” 2017. Poster presented at IEEE Texas Workshop on Integrated
System Exploration.
[36] A. Mishchenko, S. Chatterjee, R. Brayton, and N. Een, “Improvements to com-
binational equivalence checking,” in Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE/ACM Interna-
99
tional Conference on Computer-aided Design, ICCAD ’06, (New York, NY, USA),
pp. 836–843, ACM, 2006.
[37] A. Koelbl, Y. Lu, and A. Mathur, “Embedded tutorial: formal equivalence check-
ing between system-level models and rtl,” in ICCAD-2005. IEEE/ACM International
Conference on Computer-Aided Design, 2005., pp. 965–971, Nov 2005.
[38] P. Chauhan, D. Goyal, G. Hasteer, A. Mathur, and N. Sharma, “Non-cycle-accurate
sequential equivalence checking,” in 2009 46th ACM/IEEE Design Automation Con-
ference, pp. 460–465, July 2009.
[39] M. V. A. K. Kumar, A. Gupta, and S. S. Bindumadhava, “RTL2RTL formal equiv-
alence: Boosting the design confidence,” in Proceedings 2nd French Singaporean
Workshop on Formal Methods and Applications, FSFMA 2014, Singapore, 13th May
2014., pp. 29–44, 2014.
[40] R. Kaivola, R. Ghughal, N. Narasimhan, A. Telfer, J. Whittemore, S. Pandav, A. Slo-
bodová, C. Taylor, V. Frolov, E. Reeber, and A. Naik, Replacing Testing with Formal
Verification in Intel CoreTM i7 Processor Execution Engine Validation, pp. 414–429.
Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009.
[41] S. Tasiran, Y. Yu, and B. Batson, “Linking simulation with formal verification at a
higher level,” IEEE Design Test of Computers, vol. 21, pp. 472–482, Nov 2004.
[42] D. Zhang, Y. Wang, G. E. Suh, and A. C. Myers, “A hardware design language
for timing-sensitive information-flow security,” in Proceedings of the Twentieth In-
ternational Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and
Operating Systems, ASPLOS ’15, (New York, NY, USA), pp. 503–516, ACM, 2015.
[43] V. Kottapalli and S. Khatri, “A practical methodology to validate the statistical be-
havior of bloom filters,” in 2016 International Conference on Hardware/Software
100
Codesign and System Synthesis (CODES+ISSS), pp. 1–8, Oct 2016.
[44] Z. Wang and R. B. Lee, “New cache designs for thwarting software cache-based
side channel attacks,” in Proceedings of the 34th Annual International Symposium
on Computer Architecture, ISCA ’07, (New York, NY, USA), pp. 494–505, ACM,
2007.
101
APPENDIX A
SPECIFICATION
This chapter describes the high-level specification of our design. The environment
consists of a configurable N-core system with private L-1 cache for each core, an atomic
snooping bus for communication between caches, an arbiter to determine bus access, and
communication between LLC and main memory. A block diagram of the system is il-
lustrated in Figure A.1. The design (DUV) encompasses the multi-core L1 cache alone.
However, we include the level-2 cache and arbiter behavior for completeness. A key aspect
to remember is that the specification provided here is the latest version. We began with a
simple toy specification, which evolved into a full-fledged architectural definition through
the design and verification process. Several changes to the implementation like addition
of reset, removal of input-output ports, performance upgrades, etc resulted in refinements
to the specification as well.
We focus primarily on the functional aspects of the L1 cache, and avoid severe perfor-
mance optimizations. Operations on the CPU-L1 interface are blocking, implying that the
core must keep the request asserted until it gets a response from the cache. Similarly, the
common system bus is also atomic and blocking. As a result, at any instant, a maximum
of one request is pending on the system bus.
Salient features of our system are:
• Parameterized implementation
• Private L1 cache and shared L2 cache
• Separate data and instruction cache in level-1; Unified level-2 cache
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Figure A.1: Block diagram of the complete system
• 4-way associative L1 cache and 8-way L2 cache
• Physically indexed physically tagged (PIPT) cache system; No translation look-
aside buffer (TLB) needed
• Inclusive cache
• MESI-based coherence protocol
• Pseudo-LRU replacement policy
• Write-back and write-allocate schemes
• No write buffers
Our implementation is parameterized to support re-use, modularity, and formal analy-
sis. A list of configurable elements is provided below:
1. Data width: determines the data bus width, and size of each cache block
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2. Address width: determines the address space and address bus width
3. Number of index bits: defines the number of sets within the cache, subsequently
controlling size of the data and instruction L1 cache
4. Tag width: determines address tag bits for each cache line
5. Number of cores: controls the number of CPUs within the system
6. Instruction address bound: defines division of address space between data and
instructions
Figure A.2: Relation between address, tag, index and offset
Address bits are broken down to represent set index, offset and tag as shown in Figure
A.2. Both data and instructions are byte-addressable. An important point to note is that
there are certain limitations to the permitted configurations. Firstly, all the parameters are
expected to be non-zero. Data width must be a power of two. The sum of offset bit-width
index bit-width and tag size should be equal to the address width. Number of cores is
always greater than or equal to one. Lastly, instruction bound must be lower than the
maximum possible address.
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A.1 Algorithm Description
A.1.1 Replacement Policy
The level-1 cache follows a pseudo-Least Recently Used(PLRU) algorithm when the
cache set is full. Each set within the cache has a 3-bit LRU state variable. In the absence
of a free block, the LRU state dictates which line is replaced. This relation is depicted in
Table A.1, ’x’ indicates ’don’t care’. Additionally, every access to cache updates the state
as shown in Table A.2, ’-’ indicates that the bit is unchanged.
Table A.1: Pseudo-LRU replacement policy
State Replacement
00x Line 0
01x Line 1
1x0 Line 2
1x1 Line 3
Table A.2: Pseudo-LRU state update
Access Next state
Line 0 11-
Line 1 10-
Line 2 0-1
Line 3 0-0
A.1.2 MESI Protocol
Each cache line has its own MESI state which is either Modified (M), Exclusive (E),
Shared (S), or Invalid (I). The state diagram for the protocol is illustrated as Figure A.3.
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Transitions to the left of states, represent processor side requests and the subsequent con-
troller action on the shared bus. More precisely, cpu rd(read) and cpu wr(write) are re-
quests from the core; bus rdx(read with intent to modify), bus rd(read-only), and invali-
date are requests broadcast on the shared system bus. State transitions to the right, signify
incoming bus requests and corresponding responses. Each transition in the state diagram
has two components i.e. x/y. Here ’x’ signifies the incoming request either from the core
or another L-1 cache, and ’y’ indicates the required action/message on the bus.
Figure A.3: MESI coherence protocol
A.2 Design Hierarchy
The multi-core L1 cache module houses a configurable number of uni-core cache
blocks as shown in Figure A.4. It interacts with the CPU cores, arbiter and L2 cache.
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It houses an multiplexer block which is necessary to avoid input-output signals. The mul-
tiplexer serves as the interconnect, routing signals based on the arbiter outputs. It selects
the address, bus request and related signals based on processor grant. Likewise, the bus
response is routed based on snoop grant signal from the arbiter. Each uni-core cache mod-
ule has a separate instruction cache and data cache. A coherence protocol is unnecessary
for instructions based on the assumption that cores do not write to an instruction address.
Similarly, a write operation to I-cache is expected to be unacknowledged.
Figure A.4: Multi-core L1 cache design hierarchy
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A.3 IO Interface
In this section, we indicate the IO interface for a configuration of 4-core cache with
32-bit address, 32-bit cache block, 16-bit tag, 14-bit set index and 2-bit offset. This con-
figuration is the expected usage model. It is the main focus of the simulation exercise.
A.3.1 Uni-core Cache Interface
Table A.3: IO interface for uni-core cache
Signal Type Description
rst Input Active-high reset
core_id Input(2) Identifier for the cache
core_if Interface for interaction with the core
clk Input Clock signal
cpu_rd Input CPU read request
data_in_bus_cpu_lv1 Output Data valid signal for read request
cpu_wr Input CPU write request
cpu_wr_done Output Acknowledge signal for write operation
data_bus_cpu_lv1_wr Input(32) Data bus for write
data_bus_cpu_lv1_rd Output(32) Data bus for read
addr_bus_cpu_lv1 Input(32) Address bus
sbus_if Interface to system bus
in_data_bus_lv1_lv2 Input(32) Data bus for incoming SBUS request
in_addr_bus_lv1_lv2 Input(32) Address for incoming SBUS request
out_data_bus_lv1_lv2 Output(32) Data for outgoing SBUS request
out_addr_bus_lv1_lv2 Output(32) Address for outgoing SBUS request
lv2_rd Output Read to level-2 cache
lv2_wr Output Write to L2 cache
lv2_wr_done Input Write acknowledgment from L2
bus_rd_proc Output Outgoing bus read request
bus_rdx_proc Output Outgoing bus read request with intent to
modify (write)
invalidate_proc Output Outgoing invalidate request
bus_rd_snoop Input Incoming bus read request
bus_rdx_snoop Input Incoming bus read request with intent to
modify (write)
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Table A.3: Continued
Signal Type Description
invalidate_snoop Input Incoming invalidate request
in_data_in_bus_lv1_lv2 Input Response to outgoing read request
out_data_in_bus_lv1_lv2 Output Response to snoop bus_rd or bus_rdx re-
quest
shared_local Output Signal to indicate if data block is shared
shared Input Signal to indicate if data supplied by
snooping cache is shared
cp_in_cache Output Signal to L2 to ignore the read request as
a copy exists in cache
invalidation_done Output Response to incoming invalidate request
all_invalidation_done Input Signal indicating if other caches have in-
validated the data block
bus_lv1_lv2_req_proc Output Request for primary system bus access
bus_lv1_lv2_gnt_proc Input Grant of primary system bus access
bus_lv1_lv2_req_snoop Output Request for snoop system bus access
bus_lv1_lv2_gnt_snoop Input Grant of snoop system bus access
data_bus_lv1_lv2_wr Output(32) Data bus for write to L2
data_bus_lv1_lv2_rd Input(32) Data bus for read from L2
addr_bus_lv1_lv2 Output(32) Address bus
A.3.2 Multi-core Cache Interface
A.4 Expected Behavior
In this section, we describe the sequence of signals for each type of CPU request. Note
that the signal interaction is described at the uni-core cache level. The primary cache
which has system bus access is called ’proc’, and the snooping cache is labeled ’snoop’.
Uni-core operation is defined for both the proc and snoop caches. Refer to Section A.6 to
understand how uni-core signals are connected to each other.
A reset to the module is expected to completely clear the contents of all the uni-core
caches. CPUs are expected to retain the request as logic high until serviced by the cache.
Similarly, level-2 is required to retain the acknowledgment signal high until the multi-core
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Table A.4: IO interface for multi-core cache
Signal Type Description
rst Input Active-high reset
core_if Interface(4) Interaction with the cores
bus_lv1_lv2_req_proc Output(4) Request for primary system bus access
sent to arbiter
bus_lv1_lv2_gnt_proc Input(4) Grant of primary system bus access from
arbiter
bus_lv1_lv2_req_snoop Output(4) Request for snoop system bus access
sent to arbiter
bus_lv1_lv2_gnt_snoop Input(4) Grant of snoop system bus access from
arbiter
lv2_rd Output Read to level-2 cache
lv2_wr Output Write to L2 cache
lv2_wr_done Input Write acknowledgment from L2
cp_in_cache Output Signal to L2 to ignore the read request as
a copy exists in cache
L1 cache de-asserts the bus request.
A.4.1 CPU Read
A.4.1.1 Case 1: Read hit
If the block is hit in the L1 cache, then
• Data value is driven on data_bus_cpu_lv1_rd of that processor and data_in_bus_cpu_lv1
is asserted
• Signal bus_lv1_lv2_req_proc remains de-asserted
A.4.1.2 Case 2: Read miss
If the block is not present in the L1 cache, then we have two scenarios:
Scenario 1: Free block available in the set
• Bus access is requested (bus_lv1_lv2_req_proc is asserted high)
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• Wait until access is granted (bus_lv1_lv2_gnt_proc is to be made high by arbiter)
• Once access granted, bus_rd_proc and lv2_rd is raised for data, whereas only lv_rd
is asserted for instruction access. Concurrently, address of the requested block is put
in out_addr_bus_lv1_lv2. This defines the outgoing request on the system bus.
• L2 cache or another L1 cache will provide the data on in_data_bus_lv1_lv2 and
drive in_data_in_bus_lv1_lv2 high
• Appropriate cache line is updated with the data and corresponding MESI state
Following the above operation, the block will automatically hit in the cache. Therefore,
the sequence described in Case 1 is carried out to complete the request.
Snooping cache:
Concurrently, on the snoop side, L1 caches with copies of the above request block (snoop
hit) perform the following operations. Other caches with copies understand that a uni-core
cache is requesting for read-only access to the block as bus_rd_snoop signal is asserted
(which was made high by above mentioned proc side process). The multiplexer module
connects the bus_rd_proc of the primary cache(proc) to the bus_rd_snoop inputs of the
remaining uni-core cache modules.
• Signal cp_in_cache is asserted, asking L2 to ignore the current bus request
• Snoop bus access is requested (bus_lv1_lv2_req_snoop)
• If in_data_in_bus_lv1_lv2 is asserted and own snoop bus request is not granted, then
bus_lv1_lv2_req_snoop is de-asserted immediately
Copy of block is in Shared/Exclusive state
• Signal shared_local is made high
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• Data is put in out_data_bus_lv1_lv2 and out_data_in_bus_lv1_lv2 is made high
• MESI state is updated to Shared
• Signal bus_lv1_lv2_req_snoop is de-asserted
Copy of block is in Modified state
• Bus out_data_bus_lv1_lv2 is loaded with data from modified copy
• Signal lv2_wr is asserted to make level 2 cache update its value
• Wait for lv2_wr_done
• Signal shared_local is made high
• Signal out_data_in_bus_lv1_lv2 is made high
• MESI state is updated to Shared
• Signal bus_lv1_lv2_req_snoop is de-asserted
If no other level-1 cache has a copy, then level-2 cache provides the data.
Scenario 2: Free block not available in the set; replacement needed
PLRU algorithm determines the block to be evicted. If this block is Shared/Exclusive,
then the MESI state is changed to Invalid as soon as proc grant is received. No additional
message is relayed on the system bus. This is referred to as a silent eviction. However, if
the block to be replaced is in Modified state, then the following sequence of actions are
adopted.
• Signal bus_lv1_lv2_req_proc is asserted to logic high
• Address of the evicted block is generated from the tag and set index, and loaded into
bus out_addr_bus_lv1_lv2
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• Bus out_data_bus_lv1_lv2 is loaded with the dirty data
• Signal lv2_wr is made high requesting level 2 cache to update its value
• Once lv2_wr_done is made high by level 2 cache, block is assigned Invalid MESI
state
These set of operations will free the L1 cache line of the evicted block, which in turn
triggers the free block operation described above in Scenario 1.
A.4.2 CPU Write
Firstly, as soon as L1 cache receives a write request, bus_lv1_lv2_req_proc is made
high.
A.4.2.1 Case 1: Write hit
When the block is hit, then the following operations are carried out depending on the
block’s MESI state:
Scenario 1: Block in Modified or Exclusive state
• Cache data is updated with the latest value
• MESI state is altered to Modified
• Signal cpu_wr_done is raised high
• Signal bus_lv1_lv2_req_proc is made low immediately
Scenario 2: Block in Shared state
• Wait for bus_lv1_lv2_gnt_proc to be asserted
• Address is loaded onto out_addr_bus_lv1_lv2
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• Signal invalidate_proc is made high asking other level-1 caches to make their copy
invalid
• When all such copies are invalidated, all_invalidation_done is made high
• Signal bus_lv1_lv2_req_proc is de-asserted
• Cache data is updated with the latest value
• MESI state is altered to Modified
• Signal cpu_wr_done is raised high
Snoop side for invalidation request
• If block isn’t present, assert invalidation_done until all_invalidation_done is asserted
• If block is present, assert the shared_local signal; subsequently, invalidate the block
in cache and assert invalidation_done until all_invalidation_done is high
A.4.2.2 Case 2: Write miss
The write miss case, similar to the read miss case, has two possibilities.
Scenario 1: Free block available
• Wait for bus_lv1_lv2_gnt_proc to be asserted
• Raise bus_rdx_proc and lv2_rd
• Drive the address on out_addr_bus_lv1_lv2
• Wait till level 2 cache provides the data by making data_in_bus_lv1_lv2 high. Note
that data will always be provided by level 2 cache in this case (bus_rdx request)
• Once in_data_in_bus_lv1_lv2 is high, update the cache with the received data value
and modify the MESI state to Exclusive
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Following the above operation, the block will automatically hit in the cache. Therefore,
the sequence described in Case 1 for Exclusive write hit is carried out to complete the write
request.
Snooping cache:
On the snoop side, any cache with a copy of the relevant block must undertake the fol-
lowing actions. Firstly, cp_in_cache is asserted as soon as it is snoop hit for a incoming
bus_rdx request. Copy in Shared state
• Signal shared_local is made high
• Cache copy is invalidated
• Signal shared_local is made low
Copy in Exclusive state
• Cache copy is invalidated
Copy in Modified state
• Signal bus_lv1_lv2_req_snoop is raised to ask for access to the bus
• Wait for bus_lv1_lv2_gnt_snoop to be high
• Bus out_data_bus_lv1_lv2 is loaded with data from modified copy
• Signal lv2_wr is asserted to make level 2 cache update its value
• Wait for lv2_wr_done to be high
• Invalidate the copy in cache
• De-assert bus_lv1_lv2_req_snoop
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An important feature is that level-2 always provides data to a bus_rdx request. The
snooping cache with a dirty copy merely writes the data back into level-2. Subsequently,
level-2 provides the latest data value to the primary cache which made the bus_rdx request.
Scenario 2: Free block not available in the set; replacement needed
PLRU algorithm determines the block to be evicted. If this block is Shared/Exclusive,
then the MESI state is changed to Invalid as soon as proc grant is received. No additional
message is relayed on the system bus. This is referred to as a silent eviction. However, if
the block to be replaced is in Modified state, then the following sequence of actions are
adopted.
• Signal bus_lv1_lv2_req_proc is asserted to logic high
• Address of the evicted block is generated from the tag and set index, and loaded into
bus out_addr_bus_lv1_lv2
• Bus out_data_bus_lv1_lv2 is loaded with the dirty data
• Signal lv2_wr is made high requesting level 2 cache to update its value
• Once lv2_wr_done is made high by level 2 cache, block is assigned Invalid MESI
state
These set of operations will free the L1 cache line of the evicted block, which in turn
triggers the free block operation described above in Scenario 1.
A.5 Timing Specification
We illustrate timing for typical behavior in this section. Signals mentioned are with
reference to the primary cache i.e. proc cache, except when it is a snoop side scenario. In
snoop side illustrations, signals are with reference to the snoop cache.
116
Figure A.5: Read hit scenario
Figure A.6: Write hit scenario with shared block
A.6 Multiplexer Specification
The multiplexer module, within the multi-core cache, serves as the interconnect and
glue-logic between uni-core L1 caches and the level-2 cache. The uni-core cache which
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Figure A.7: Snoop scenario for bus rd with copy in shared/exclusive
Figure A.8: Snoop scenario for bus rd with copy in modified
has obtained primary system bus access is referred to as ’proc’, other L1 caches and L2
are known as the snooping caches. Here, we describe the routing of signals from the proc
side to the snooping caches.
• Signal lv2_rd supplied to L2 is the logical OR of individual uni-core lv2_rd
• Signal lv2_wr supplied to L2 is the logical OR of individual uni-core lv2_wr
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• Signal cp_in_cache supplied to L2 is the logical OR of individual uni-core cp_in_cache
• Signal shared is the logical OR of individual uni-core shared_local signals
• Signal all_invalidation_done is the logical AND of all snooping L1 cache’s invali-
dation_done
• Output bus_rd_proc from the proc cache is routed to input bus_rd_snoop of all the
snooping L1 caches
• Output bus_rdx_proc from the proc cache is routed to input bus_rdx_snoop of all
the snooping L1 caches
• Output invalidate_proc from the proc cache is routed to input invalidate_snoop of
all the snooping L1 caches
• Input address bus of snooping caches (L1 and L2) is always driven by the output
out_addr_bus_lv1_lv2 of the proc cache
• Signal in_data_in_bus_lv1_lv2 is driven by the snooping cache with snoop grant
access to the system bus
• Input data to all the caches (L1 and L2) is driven by output data bus of the snooping
cache with snoop grant access to the shared bus. If none of the caches have snoop
grant and lv2_wr is high, data is routed from proc’s out_data_bus_lv1_lv2
A.7 Level-2 Cache
Last level cache is unified, and shared by all the cores. It does not distinguish between
data and instruction address space. If cp_in_cache is logic high, LLC should ignore every
request. An operation, can either be read(lv2_rd) or write(lv2_wr), and is processed only
when cp_in_cache is low. MESI related signals bus_rd, bus_rdx, and invalidate do not
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concern the level-2 cache. However, it plays a crucial role in the MESI protocol by sup-
plying updated data value and processing write-backs. We define the timing specification
in Figures A.9 and A.10.
Figure A.9: Read serviced by level-2 cache
Figure A.10: Write back to level-2 cache
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A.8 Arbiter Specification
This module arbitrates access to the shared system bus. There are two types of access
to the common bus, namely processor side access and snoop side access. A simple round-
robin scheme based on least-recently serviced cache is used for the processor side access.
A fixed priority scheme is used for snoop access.
With respect to processor (primary) access, if only one request is observed, it is granted
access on the next clock cycle. However, if more than one request is observed, the least-
recently served cache is granted access first. L1-caches are expected to retain the request
signal high, until serviced. A sample timing diagram is depicted in Figure A.11.
With respect to snoop access, request is granted based on the fixed priority. For the
instance of a 4-core system, L1-cache0 > L1-cache1 > L1-cache2 > L1-cache3 > level-2
cache. LLC is always given the lowest priority. Snoop request is expected to be high, until
one of the snooping cache is given access.
Figure A.11: Arbiter timing diagram
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APPENDIX B
PROPERTIES
Properties form the crux of any formal property verification exercise. Here, we detail
the cover statements, assumptions and assertions used in various stages of our verification
effort.
B.1 Cover Points
Cover points are often mistakenly thought of as an afterthought to FPV. This can be
disastrous especially in cases when assumptions over-constrain the design. Cover state-
ments ensure that the set of typical behavior expected from the design is possible under the
given set of constraints. They should ideally include: every specified operation, all legal
input-output values, and each type of transaction. This section describes the cover points
used to consistently sanity check our FPV environment. They are reviewed in every stage
of FPV, whenever any of the assumptions are updated.
B.1.1 Uni-core Module
The following cover statements were defined for FPV of the uni-core cache module.
Note that the state transition cover points were defined specifically for a particular cache
line. Additionally, the state transition statements had two versions, namely an immediate
version and an eventual variety. The immediate variant dictates that the state transition
happened in a single clock cycle. An immediate transition from modified/exclusive to
shared is improbable. Therefore, an immediate variant was not defined for these two
transformations. The eventual version prescribed that the MESI state eventually changed
from X to Y.
1. CPU read transaction
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Simple read operation initiated by the CPU core, and completed with valid data
returned by the associated L1 cache.
2. CPU write transaction
Simple write operation initiated by the core and acknowledged by the associated
L1-cache with write done signal.
3. Outgoing bus_rd_proc transaction
A bus_rd request initiated by the uni-core module.
4. Outgoing bus_rdx_proc transaction
A bus_rdx request initiated by the uni-core module.
5. Outgoing invalidate_proc transaction
An invalidate request initiated by the module.
6. Incoming bus_rd_snoop request
An incoming bus_rd request, serviced by the uni-core cache.
7. Incoming bus_rdx_snoop request
An incoming bus_rdx request serviced by the module.
8. Incoming invalidate_snoop request
An incoming invalidation request and the corresponding response from the uni-core
cache.
9. Instruction cache read miss scenario
An instruction read operation with access to the L2 cache over the system bus.
10. Data cache read miss scenario
A data read operation serviced either by level-2 or another L1 cache.
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11. Invalid to modified state transition
12. Invalid to shared state transition
13. Invalid to exclusive state transition
14. Exclusive to invalid state transition
15. Exclusive to shared state transition
16. Exclusive to modified state transition
17. Shared to invalid state transition
18. Shared to exclusive state transition
19. Shared to modified state transition
20. Modified to invalid state transition
21. Modified to exclusive state transition
22. Modified to shared state transition
Additionally, we analyzed the behavior for race conditions and contention between
the CPU side and bus side requests with the following cover statements. Contention arises
when CPU and bus-side operations simultaneously access the same data block. We classify
the possible scenarios based on whether the CPU request arrived before or after the snoop-
side message. If both requests are received at the exact same cycle, snoop-side request is
assumed to have occurred first.
1. CPU first, read hit followed by bus_rd
CPU request is received to a data block in the cache. Before the processor operation
is completed, a bus_rd request for the same block is observed on the snoop-side bus.
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2. CPU first, read miss followed by bus_rd
CPU request to a data block not present in L1 cache. The uni-core cache has ob-
tained the arbiter grant and received a copy of the data block into its cache. Before
the CPU operation is completed, a bus_rd request for the same block is observed on
the snoop side.
3. CPU first, read hit followed by bus_rdx
4. CPU first, read miss followed by bus_rdx
5. CPU first, read hit followed by invalidate
6. CPU first, read miss followed by invalidate
7. CPU first, write hit followed by bus_rd
8. CPU first, write miss followed by bus_rd
9. CPU first, write hit followed by bus_rdx
10. CPU first, write miss followed by bus_rdx
11. CPU first, write hit followed by invalidate
12. CPU first, write miss followed by invalidate
13. Snoop first, bus_rd followed by CPU read
A snoop side bus_rd request is received. Before the snoop-side operation is serviced,
a CPU read request is observed.
14. Snoop first, bus_rd followed by CPU write
15. Snoop first, bus_rdx followed by CPU read
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16. Snoop first, bus_rdx followed by CPU write
17. Snoop first, invalidate followed by CPU read
18. Snoop first, invalidate followed by CPU write
B.1.2 Multi-core Module
FPV of the multi-core module re-used all the cover points identified in the uni-core
effort. Additionally, the following cover statements were used to ensure typical behavior
and accuracy in the arbiter and memory reference models.
1. Primary grant (bus_lv1_lv2_gnt_proc) is provided to each of the uni-core caches.
2. Snoop grant (bus_lv1_lv2_gnt_snoop) is provided to each of the uni-core caches.
3. All combinations of i and j, such that L1-cachei has proc grant and L1-cachej has
snoop grant of the system bus.
4. Consecutive proc grants separated by a fixed delay
5. Consecutive snoop grants separated by a fixed delay
6. All primary bus (proc) requests asserted and eventually serviced by the arbiter.
7. Maximum possible snoop requests asserted and eventually transaction is completed.
B.2 Assumptions
Assumptions describe the legal behavior of the model inputs. They define the environ-
ment in which the DUV is expected to perform. They effectively constrain the problem
space explored by the FPV tool. In order to facilitate full-proof verification, FPV was
performed in increasing stages of complexity. Several simplifications, in the form of addi-
tional constraints, are introduced in early phases of our formal verification endeavor. We
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clearly indicate these assumptions, which served to over constrain the design, as used only
in specific stages of the verification process.
B.2.1 Uni-core Module
The generic assumptions common to all complexity stages are listed below:
1. Signals cpu_rd and cpu_wr cannot be high simultaneously in the same clock cycle.
2. Inputs on the CPU-lv1 interface are always legal i.e. no high impedance or unknown
value.
3. Inputs on the system bus(sbus) interface are always legal.
4. Input address on the CPU-lv1 interface is stable during a CPU operation. In other
words, address in unchanged whenever signal cpu_rd or cpu_wr is logic high.
5. Input data on the core interface is stable for the entire duration of a CPU write
request.
6. Input address on the sbus interface is stable for the entire duration of an incoming
snoop-side request.
7. Input data on the sbus interface is stable as long as data valid signal(in_data_in_bus_lv1_lv2)
is asserted.
8. A read request to level-2 cache is serviced within a fixed number of clock cycles,
say BUS_DATA_TIME.
9. A write request to level-2 cache is serviced within a fixed number of clock cycles,
namely LV2_WR_RESP_TIME.
10. An outgoing invalidate request is serviced within a fixed delay, represented by the
parameter INVALIDATE_TIME.
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11. Signal cpu_rd is de-asserted on the cycle after data valid signal is received from the
level-1 cache.
12. Signal cpu_wr is de-asserted on the clock cycle following a write acknowledgment
from the uni-core cache.
13. An incoming snoop-side bus_rd request is de-asserted once data is provided by
our uni-core module. In terms of signals, out_data_in_bus_lv1_lv2 triggers the de-
assertion of bus_rd_snoop
14. An incoming snoop side bus_rdx request is de-asserted once data is provided by the
level-2 cache.
15. An incoming invalidate snoop-side request is de-asserted on the cycle immediately
after invalidation_done is driven high.
16. Signal shared is high as soon as shared_local is driven logic high.
17. Signal all_invalidation_done is asserted only if invalidation_done is high or an out-
going invalidate request is initiated by the uni-core module.
18. Processor grant(bus_lv1_lv2_gnt_proc) is provided only if the L1 cache has re-
quested for system bus access(bus_lv1_lv2_req_proc).
19. Snoop grant(bus_lv1_lv2_gnt_snoop) is provided only if the L1 cache has requested
for snooping access to system bus access(bus_lv1_lv2_req_snoop).
20. Signal in_data_in_bus_lv1_lv2 can be high only if lv2_rd is active.
21. Signal lv2_wr_done can be high only if lv2_wr is active.
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22. Snoop side requests are mutually exclusive. Therefore, a maximum of one request
from bus_rd_snoop, bus_rdx_snoop, and invalidate_snoop can be active at any point
of time.
23. An ongoing snoop side request implies that processor grant (bus_lv1_lv2_gnt_proc)
is not given to the uni-core module.
24. Signal in_data_in_bus_lv1_lv2 can be asserted only if the unicore cache has primary
access of the system bus.
25. CPU read request remains high until serviced by L1 cache.
26. CPU write request remains asserted until acknowledged by L1 cache.
27. Snoop side bus_rd request must remain asserted until data is provided by the module
if it has obtained snoop access of the system bus.
28. Snoop side bus_rd request should be high for a minimum of three clock cycles.
29. Snoop side bus_rdx request must remain high as long as cp_in_cache is driven high
by the module under consideration.
30. Snoop side bus_rdx request should be high for a minimum of two clock cycles.
31. Snoop side invalidate request should remain high until the following cycle of a rising
edge on all_invalidation_done.
32. Snoop side request implies that the address of a data block is present on the input
address (in_addr_bus_lv1_lv2) of the shared bus.
33. An outgoing invalidate request is serviced within one clock cycle i.e. INVALI-
DATE_TIME is equal to 1 (This assumption is true as a result of arbiter specifica-
tion).
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34. An incoming snoop-side invalidate request depends on the current module’s invali-
dation_done signal alone. In other words, all_invalidation_done signal is high when-
ever invalidation_done is high (This assumption is true as a result of arbiter specifi-
cation).
B.2.1.1 Complexity stage 1
The following assumptions are specific to the first stage of the process. They serve to
simplify the verification problem.
1. Allow write operations only to a data block
2. Processor grant (bus_lv1_lv2_gnt_proc) is provided immediately on the clock cycle
following a primary access request (bus_lv1_lv2_req_proc) to the system bus.
3. Snoop grant (bus_lv1_lv2_gnt_snoop) is provided immediately on the clock cycle
following a snoop access request (bus_lv1_lv2_req_snoop) to the system bus.
4. Data is provided on the system bus within a fixed latency (BUS_DATA_RESP = 2).
B.2.1.2 Complexity stage 2
1. Allow write operations to all blocks (instruction and data).
2. Processor grant (bus_lv1_lv2_gnt_proc) is provided immediately on the clock cycle
following a primary access request (bus_lv1_lv2_req_proc) to the system bus.
3. Snoop grant (bus_lv1_lv2_gnt_snoop) is provided immediately on the clock cycle
following a snoop access request (bus_lv1_lv2_req_snoop) to the system bus.
4. Data is provided on the system bus within a fixed latency (BUS_DATA_RESP = 3).
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B.2.1.3 Complexity stage 3
1. Allow write operations to all blocks (instruction and data).
2. Processor grant (bus_lv1_lv2_gnt_proc) is provided within 45 clock cycle following
a primary access request (bus_lv1_lv2_req_proc) to the system bus. Value of 45 is
determined using worst case analysis for a 4-core system. If each of the other L1-
caches perform a system bus operation including eviction and write-back, it would
take each L1 cache exactly 15 cycles. This analysis is validated in multi-core FPV.
3. Snoop grant (bus_lv1_lv2_gnt_snoop) is provided immediately on the clock cycle
following a snoop access request (bus_lv1_lv2_req_snoop) to the system bus only
if the block is in modified/exclusive state.
4. Data is provided on the system bus within a fixed latency (BUS_DATA_RESP = 9).
The value of 9 is determined using multi-core FPV.
B.2.2 Multi-core Module
Assumptions on inputs of the core_if in the uni-core setting are re-used in the multi-
core environment. These assumptions, which define behavior of the CORE (CPU), are
in accordance with the specification. All other assumptions used in the uni-core setting
are converted into assertions in the instantiation environment. We use auxiliary SV code,
compliant with the specification, to model behavior of level-2 cache and the round-robin
arbiter. No additional constraints were necessary for the multi-core FPV effort.
Auxiliary SV code for level-2 and arbiter is provided below:
1 / /−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
2 / / model f o r a r b i t e r
3 / /−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
4 wire proc_gn t_any , snoop_gn t_any ;
5
6 b i t [ ‘NO_OF_CORE−1 : 0 ] b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ g n t _ p r o c _ p r e ;
7 b i t [ ‘NO_OF_CORE−1 : 0 ] b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ g n t _ s n o o p _ p r e ;
8
9 b i t [ 1 : 0 ] c o u n t [NO_OF_CORE−1 : 0 ] ;
131
10
11 a s s i g n p r o c _ g n t _ a n y = | b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ g n t _ p r o c ;
12 a s s i g n snoop_gn t_any = | b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ g n t _ s n o o p ;
13 i n t va l , number , max ;
14
15 f u n c t i o n i n t gnt_number ( ) ;
16 max = 0 ;
17 f o r ( i n t i =0 ; i <‘NO_OF_CORE ; i ++) begin
18 i f ( b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ r e q _ p r o c [ i ] == 1 ’ b1 ) begin
19 i f ( c o u n t [ i ] > max ) begin
20 max = c o u n t [ i ] ;
21 number = i ;
22 end
23 end
24 end
25 r e t u r n number ;
26 endfunc t ion
27
28 always@ ( posedge c l k or posedge r s t ) begin
29 i f ( r s t ) begin
30 b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ g n t _ p r o c _ p r e <= ‘NO_OF_CORE’ b0 ;
31 f o r ( i n t i =0 ; i <‘NO_OF_CORE ; i = i +1) begin
32 c o u n t [ i ] <= i ;
33 end
34 end e l s e i f (~ p r o c _ g n t _ a n y && ( | b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ r e q _ p r o c ) ) begin
35 i f ( ! ( | ( b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ r e q _ p r o c & ( b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ r e q _ p r o c −1) ) ) ) begin
36 b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ g n t _ p r o c _ p r e <= b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ r e q _ p r o c ;
37 end e l s e begin
38 b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ g n t _ p r o c _ p r e <= ‘NO_OF_CORE’ b0 ;
39 v a l = gnt_number ( ) ;
40 b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ g n t _ p r o c _ p r e [ v a l ] <= 1 ’ b1 ;
41 f o r ( i n t i =0 ; i <‘NO_OF_CORE ; i = i +1) begin
42 i f ( i != v a l && c o u n t [ i ] < c o u n t [ v a l ] ) begin
43 c o u n t [ i ] <= c o u n t [ i ] + 1 ;
44 end
45 end
46 c o u n t [ v a l ] <= 2 ’ b0 ;
47 end
48 end e l s e i f ( p r o c _ g n t _ a n y ) begin
49 b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ g n t _ p r o c _ p r e <= b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ g n t _ p r o c ;
50 end e l s e begin
51 b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ g n t _ p r o c _ p r e <= ‘NO_OF_CORE’ b0 ;
52 end
53 end
54
55 / / snoop g r a n t
56 always@ ( posedge c l k or posedge r s t ) begin
57 i f ( r s t ) begin
58 b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ g n t _ s n o o p _ p r e <= ‘NO_OF_CORE’ b0 ;
59 b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ g n t _ l v 2 _ p r e <= 1 ’ b0 ;
60 end e l s e i f ( ! p r o c _ g n t _ a n y ) begin
61 b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ g n t _ s n o o p _ p r e <= ‘NO_OF_CORE’ b0 ;
62 b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ g n t _ l v 2 _ p r e <= 1 ’ b0 ;
63 end e l s e begin
64 b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ g n t _ s n o o p _ p r e <= ‘NO_OF_CORE’ b0 ;
65 i f ( b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ r e q _ s n o o p [ 0 ] == 1 ’ b1 )
66 b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ g n t _ s n o o p _ p r e [ 0 ] <= 1 ’ b1 ;
67 e l s e i f ( b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ r e q _ s n o o p [ 1 ] == 1 ’ b1 )
68 b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ g n t _ s n o o p _ p r e [ 1 ] <= 1 ’ b1 ;
69 e l s e i f ( b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ r e q _ s n o o p [ 2 ] == 1 ’ b1 )
70 b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ g n t _ s n o o p _ p r e [ 2 ] <= 1 ’ b1 ;
71 e l s e i f ( b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ r e q _ s n o o p [ 3 ] == 1 ’ b1 )
72 b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ g n t _ s n o o p _ p r e [ 3 ] <= 1 ’ b1 ;
73 e l s e i f ( b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ r e q _ l v 2 )
74 b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ g n t _ l v 2 _ p r e <= 1 ’ b0 ;
75 end
76 end
77
78 mc_u_proc_gnt : assume p r o p e r t y ( b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ g n t _ p r o c == ( b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ g n t _ p r o c _ p r e &
b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ r e q _ p r o c ) ) ;
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79 mc_u_snoop_gnt : assume p r o p e r t y ( b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ g n t _ s n o o p == ( b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ g n t _ s n o o p _ p r e &
b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ r e q _ s n o o p ) ) ;
80 mc_u_lv2_gnt : assume p r o p e r t y ( b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ g n t _ l v 2 == ( b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ g n t _ l v 2 _ p r e &
b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ r e q _ l v 2 ) ) ;
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82 / /−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
83 / / model f o r memory
84 / /−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
85 b i t [DATA_WID−1:0] memory [(1 < <(ADDR_WID−OFFSET_WID) ) −1:0] ;
86 b i t [DATA_WID−1:0] v a l i d _ d a t a ;
87 b i t lv2_wr_done_pre , d a t a _ i n _ b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ p r e , b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ r e q _ l v 2 ;
88
89 always@ ( posedge c l k ) begin
90 i f ( r s t ) begin
91 f o r ( i n t i =0 ; i <(‘DL_ADDR_BOUND> >2) ; i = i +1) begin
92 memory [ i ] <= ‘DATA_WID_LV1’ hD ;
93 end
94 v a l i d _ d a t a <= ‘DATA_WID_LV1’ h00 ;
95 d a t a _ i n _ b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ p r e <= 1 ’ b0 ;
96 l v2_wr_done_pre <= 1 ’ b0 ;
97 end e l s e i f ( l v 2 _ r d && ~ c p _ i n _ c a c h e && b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ g n t _ l v 2 ) begin
98 v a l i d _ d a t a <= memory [ a d d r _ b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 [ADDR_WID−1:OFFSET_WID ] ] ;
99 d a t a _ i n _ b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ p r e <= 1 ’ b1 ;
100 end e l s e i f ( lv2_wr ) begin
101 memory [ a d d r _ b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 [ADDR_WID−1:OFFSET_WID ] ] <=
d a t a _ b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ w r ;
102 l v2_wr_done_pre <= 1 ’ b1 ;
103 end e l s e begin
104 d a t a _ i n _ b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ p r e <= 1 ’ b0 ;
105 l v2_wr_done_pre <= 1 ’ b0 ;
106 end
107 end
108
109 mc_u_ lv2_da t a_ rd : assume p r o p e r t y ( d a t a _ b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ r d == v a l i d _ d a t a ) ;
110 mc_u_da ta_ in_bus : assume p r o p e r t y ( d a t a _ i n _ b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 == ( d a t a _ i n _ b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ p r e &
l v 2 _ r d ) ) ;
111 mc_u_lv2_wr_done : assume p r o p e r t y ( lv2_wr_done == ( lv2_wr_done_pre & lv2_wr ) ) ;
112 mc_u_lv2_req1 : assume p r o p e r t y ( ( l v 2 _ r d && ! c p _ i n _ c a c h e ) |= > b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ r e q _ l v 2 ) ;
113 mc_u_lv2_req2 : assume p r o p e r t y ( ( ! l v 2 _ r d | | c p _ i n _ c a c h e ) |= > ! b u s _ l v 1 _ l v 2 _ r e q _ l v 2 ) ;
B.3 Assertions
Assertions are properties that we wish to prove about the design under legal stimu-
lus. These statements are directly derived from the specification. Assertions are generally
properties about the DUV’s outputs, while assumptions describe the DUV’s inputs. Asser-
tions, which provide maximum insight, are end-to-end variants which only consider ports
at the IO interface of the module. Alternatively, assertions can also be defined in terms
of internal design signals. We use a mixture of end-to-end and internal assertions in our
analysis.
B.3.1 Uni-core Module
Assertions defined for the uni-core FPV effort are described below.
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B.3.1.1 CPU-lv1 interface
1. All outputs on the CPU-lv1 interface should be legal.
2. CPU read and write response signals are mutually exclusive.
3. Signal data_in_bus_cpu_lv1 is high only if CPU read operation is requested.
4. Write acknowledgment (cpu_wr_done) is given only if a CPU write operation is
requested.
5. Output data bus is unchanged as long as data valid signal is logic high.
B.3.1.2 System bus interface
1. All outputs on the system bus interface should be legal.
2. Output address is unchanged when a outgoing request on the system bus, namely
lv2_rd, lv2_wr, or invalidate_proc is asserted.
3. Data output to level-2 cache is stable during a level-2 write operation.
4. Data returned in response to a snoop-side bus_rd operation should be stable as long
as out_data_in_bus_lv1_lv2 is logic high.
5. Signal cp_in_cache can go high only if there was a snoop side request (bus_rd or
bus_rdx) on the previous clock cycle.
6. If there is an active snoop side request and lv2wr are asserted, signal cp_in_cache
should be logic high.
7. If out_data_in_bus_lv1_lv2 is high, i.e. uni-core module is providing data to another
L1 cache, shared_local and cp_in_cache signals must be asserted.
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8. If an outgoing bus_rd or bus_rdx operation is on-going, lv2_rd should be asserted.
9. If a level-2 read operation is in progress, a rising edge on data valid signal should
trigger a falling edge on level-2 read request in the next clock cycle.
10. If a level-2 write operation is in progress, a rising edge on lv2_wr_done signal should
trigger a falling edge on level-2 write request in the next clock cycle.
11. If a bus read operation is in progress, a rising edge on data valid signal should trigger
a falling edge on bus_rd_proc in the next clock cycle.
12. If a ’bus read with intent to modify’ operation is in progress, a rising edge on data
valid signal should trigger a falling edge on bus_rdx_proc in the next clock cycle.
13. If an outgoing invalidate operation is in progress, a rising edge on all_invalidation_done
signal should trigger a falling edge on invalidate_proc in the next clock cycle.
14. Level-2 read and write signals cannot be asserted at the same instant.
15. The uni-core module can initiate a request (lv2_rd, bus_rd, bus_rdx, or invalidate)
only if it has primary access granted to the system bus (bus_lv1_lv2_gnt_proc).
16. The uni-core module can initiate a level-2 write only if it has either primary or snoop
access granted to the system bus.
17. DUV should request for primary access to the system bus only if any CPU operation
is pending on the CPU-lv1 interface.
B.3.1.3 Liveness properties
1. A CPU read operation is completed within a fixed number of clock cycles, repre-
sented by CPU_RD_RESP_TIME.
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2. A CPU write operation is completed within a fixed number of clock cycles, repre-
sented by CPU_WR_RESP_TIME.
B.3.1.4 MESI protocol
1. A state transition from invalid to modified implies that there was a CPU write to the
relevant data block, which resulted in a outward bus_rdx request on the system bus.
2. A transition from invalid to shared implies that a CPU read operation resulted in a
cache miss and shared signal was high in response to the outward bus_rd request.
3. A transition from invalid to exclusive state implies that a CPU read operation re-
sulted in a cache miss and shared signal was low.
4. A shared to invalid transition implies either of two possibilities. First, the relevant
cache block was evicted by a CPU operation. Second, an incoming snoop side
request i.e. either bus_rdx_snoop or invalidate_snoop invalidated the data block.
5. A shared to exclusive transition should never be observed.
6. A change from shared to modified state implies that there was a CPU write opera-
tion, which resulted in an outward invalidation request.
7. A transition from exclusive to invalid state again implies two possibilities. First,
the relevant cache block was evicted by a CPU operation. Second, an incoming
snoop side request i.e. either bus_rdx_snoop or invalidate_snoop invalidated the
data block.
8. An exclusive to shared transition implies an incoming bus_rd request was observed
on the snoop-side system bus.
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9. An exclusive to modified transition assures us that a CPU write operation resulted
in a hit to this exclusive block.
10. A modified to invalid transition implies two possibilities. First, the relevant cache
block was evicted by a CPU operation. Second, an incoming snoop side request i.e.
either bus_rdx_snoop or invalidate_snoop invalidated the data block.
11. A modified to exclusive state transition is improbable.
12. A modified to shared state change is always triggered by a incoming bus_rd request
on the common bus.
B.3.1.5 Coherence and memory consistency
The properties described in this section are crucial to guarantee coherence and memory
consistency. They are inspired by the invariants defining coherence, presented in Section
1.1. A reference model is required to facilitate these assertions. This model maintains a
copy of the valid data, which is referred as VCompData, within the verification component.
Whenever data is supplied by the DUV, we essentially check for equivalence between the
supplied data and VCompData. This copy is updated whenever there is a new CPU write
operation to the uni-core module under consideration. Additionally, VCompData is also
updated when an updated value is presented in response to a bus or level-2 read.
1. Data output by the uni-core module in response to a CPU read operation is equivalent
to VCompData.
2. Data written back to level-2 cache by the DUV, in case of modified block eviction,
is equal to VCompData.
3. Data written back to level-2 cache in response to an inward bus_rdx request is the
same as VCompData.
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4. Data provided by the DUV in response to a snoop-side bus_rd request is equivalent
to VCompData.
B.3.1.6 Bug fixes
Several properties were added on-the-fly during the verification process. Specifically,
the assertions in this section were added to reflect the proposed bug fixes. They are vital
to ensure that design changes were implemented flawlessly.
A reference model was created to mimic the major architectural change propose d to
overcome the contention issue between the processor and snoop-side requests. The ref-
erence model accurately recreates variables Conflict, CPUFirst, and SnoopFirst. Variable
Conflict signified that a simultaneous CPU and snoop request to the same data block is ob-
served. CPUFirst implies that the CPU operation must be given higher priority. Similarly
SnoopFirst implies that the snoop-side request must be completed with higher priority.
As a corollary, CPU operations are halted when SnoopFirst is asserted, and snoop-side
requests are stalled when CPUFirst is logic high. This is clearly in line with the bug fix
proposed in Section 5.2.2. The assertions relevant to this bug fix are listed below:
1. If there is a conflict and SnoopFirst has been asserted, the CPU operation should not
receive a response.
2. If there is a conflict and CPUFirst has been asserted, the snoop-side request should
not receive a response from this uni-core module.
Additionally, the following assertions were added to validate other independent bug
fixes.
1. Signal data_in_bus_cpu_lv1 can be high only when input cpu_rd is high.
2. Signal cpu_wr_done can be high only when input cpu_wr is high.
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3. Once the DUV has obtained primary access of the system bus, it should either re-
quest level-2 read, write or bus invalidate.
4. Once the DUV has obtained snoop side access of the system bus, it should either
provide data or perform a write-back to level-2 cache.
B.3.2 Multi-core Module
All assertions from uni-core FPV were re-used in the multi-core module’s property
verification. All assumptions, except constraints on inputs of core_if, are redefined as
assertions for multi-core FPV. This guarantees that the assumptions defined in uni-core
verification are valid and safe. Additionally, we defined the following assertions specifi-
cally to guarantee accurate behavior of the arbiter model.
1. Outputs of the multi-core module are valid and legal
2. Address is stable during level-2 read and write
3. Data is unchanged during level-2 write
4. Primary (proc) grant to system bus is one-hot encoded. In other words, no more than
one agent can hold primary access to the shared bus.
5. Snoop grant to the system bus is one-hot encoded. No more than a single agent is
provided snoop grant.
6. A logic high on any snoop grant, implies that one bit on proc grant was asserted in
the previous cycle.
7. A logic high on any proc request, implies that either proc grant will be asserted in
the next cycle or one of the L1-caches will drop its request in the following cycle.
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Most importantly, we defined the coherence and consistency assertion based on the
data-value invariant. A CPU read on any of the cores should provide data on the previous
successful CPU write. This is easily described as an end-to-end assertion in the multi-core
model’s FPV.
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